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This chapter develops an account of intentional action centred on the notion of agential control. The core thesis, Intentionality as Control, proposes that acting intentionally simply is acting with control. Drawing on the account of control defended in the previous chapter, it argues that intentional action requires practical knowledge of what one is doing. The chapter addresses several complications, including the distinction between progressive and perfective aspects of action (what one is doing versus what one has done), with particular attention to ballistic actions where control is temporally limited. One consequence of this account is a version of the controversial thesis that acting intentionally requires knowing what you are doing. This requirement is defended against objections. Finally, the chapter concludes by showing how this control-centric approach can accommodate the insights of more traditional accounts that focus on reasons explanation as the key to the nature of intentional action.
The focus of this chapter is on the epistemology of intentional action, and especially on the distinctive first-personal ‘agential knowledge’ agents have of what they are intentionally doing. The chapter critically examines three influential approaches – the ‘two-factor’ view, perceptual ‘monitoring’ accounts, and cognitivist/normativist theories – and argues that none of them is fully satisfactory. The chapter goes on to suggest an alternative, based on the idea of agential control as a basic capacity for knowledge. This view, it is argued, helps explain not only the necessity of agential knowledge for intentional action, but also the sense in which such knowledge appears to be ‘groundless’. It does so, moreover, in a way that readily fits within a broader, and independently motivated, epistemological framework. Importantly, the argument of this chapter is largely self-standing, and does not presuppose the conclusions of earlier chapters. As such, it can be seen as providing independent support for one of the main contentions of this book, namely, that control should be understood as a capacity for knowledge.
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