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This chapter challenges economic consequentialism by testing behavioural equivalence across economically isomorphic decisions and documenting systematic violations. Evidence spans lying aversion in sender–receiver versus isomorphic Dictator Games; moral linguistic framings that reshape choices in Ultimatum, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Dictator, and Equity–Efficiency Trade-Off games; and the ‘dark side’ where moral labels strategically manipulate others and even increase corruption. Beyond social contexts, language also shifts intertemporal, risk, and ownership decisions (e.g., foreign-language effects). Together, the results imply that utilities depend not only on outcomes, probabilities, and timing but also on language that activates moral norms and beliefs, motivating a shift to language-based utility.
This chapter argues that language matters for economic decisions and that modern large language models (LLMs) can quantify this effect. After outlining the limits of lexicon-based tools, it examines BERT and MoralBERT, showing that generic sentiment scores struggle to predict human behaviour, while adding moral dimensions helps but the results remain imperfect. LLM-based chatbots (e.g., GPT-4) enable context-sensitive sentiment estimates that predict framing effects, particularly in Dictator Games. Building on this, the chapter formalises language-based utility functions that combine payoffs with sentiment or moral polarity and derives testable predictions. Evidence across Dictator, Equity–Efficiency, and Bribery games supports the approach, while highlighting caveats and aveThe chapter highlights applicationsnues for refinement.
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