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This chapter continues the case for optimistic skepticism by examining whether meaningful forms of love and friendship require belief in free will. The chapter explores various kinds of love – romantic love, parental love, agape love, and the Buddhist virtue of loving-kindness – and argues that none of them depend on the kind of free will required for basic desert moral responsibility. In fact, adopting a skeptical perspective may enhance our ability to cultivate deeper and more compassionate forms of love. Drawing on psychological and philosophical sources, the author shows that many of the factors that lead us to love others – such as personality, shared values, and vulnerability – are not within our control, yet they remain central to authentic and fulfilling relationships. The chapter also explores the Buddhist notion of metta (loving-kindness), emphasizing its emphasis on universal goodwill without attachment or conditions. In the final section, the author turns to Aristotle’s account of friendship to argue that genuine friendship is essential to human flourishing (eudaimonia) and that free will skepticism preserves what matters most in these relationships: mutual support, character development, and shared purpose. Overall, the chapter defends a rich and affirming account of love and friendship that thrives without belief in free will.
This chapter addresses the common concern that free will skepticism undermines morality. The author argues that this fear is misplaced. While skepticism about free will and basic desert moral responsibility challenges some traditional moral practices – particularly backward-looking blame – it does not eliminate the meaningfulness of moral judgments or ethical life. The chapter explains how axiological judgments of good and bad, deontic “ought” judgments, and respect for persons can all be preserved within a framework that denies basic desert. Drawing on contemporary moral philosophy, the chapter defends the idea that moral life is still possible – and even enriched – when we shift away from blame and toward virtue. The second half of the chapter turns from deontic ethics to virtue ethics, especially Aristotelian and Buddhist traditions, arguing that the central question of morality is not “What ought I do?” but “What kind of person should I be?” From this standpoint, free will skepticism supports the cultivation of virtues like compassion, humility, and loving-kindness, which do not rely on desert-based assumptions. Rather than weakening our moral lives, the author contends, free will skepticism provides a more compassionate, realistic, and psychologically attuned ethical framework – one that better promotes human flourishing and moral development.
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