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Debates inspired by Sellars’ “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man” have largely focused on the manifest and scientific images, ignoring their precursor: the original image. Yet, understanding Sellars’ characterization of the transition from the original to the manifest image is crucial for making sense of his view. The attempt to do so raises two problems. The first is a conceptual problem: a puzzling inconsistency baked into Sellars’ account of the transition. After reviewing responses to it from Garfield, Mitani, and Christias, I argue that the puzzle dissolves when we recognize that, for Sellars, the original and manifest images are both instances of what he calls “the conceptual framework of persons.” The second, historical problem concerns the question of why the transition from the original image to the manifest image occurred. I surface the history of ideas informing Sellars’ view that the transition was inevitable. I then turn to more recent developments in the social sciences that recognize the agency of inhabitants of the original image and recast the transition as involving exploitation and domination. I conclude by suggesting that, on this updated view, Sellars’ own commitments make the refinement of the conceptual framework of persons into an unfinished project.
This chapter examines the basic features of Sellars’s conceptual role account of abstract entities by focusing specifically on his account of the categories, beginning with his remarks on Ockham, Wittgenstein, and Kant. Assuming here the general viability of his general “functional classification” account of meaning and abstract entities in response to the usual realist objections, I focus rather on the complex role that ontological categories actually play in certain key aspects of Sellars’s metaphysical and epistemological views. Displaying the categories at work in this way raises fundamental questions both about their nature and about the role of categorial ontology in general, as well as casting a different light on the myth of the given and on the relations between the manifest and scientific images of the world. The overall contention is that Sellars’ nominalism is far more central than has generally been realized to each of Sellars’ most famous and enduring philosophical conceptions: the myth of the given, the logical space of reasons, and resolving the ostensible clash between the manifest and scientific images of the human being in the world.
I identify and propose to resolve a contradiction in Sellars’s ontology. On the one hand, as a scientific realist, he is committed to the thesis that scientific descriptions and explanations have priority over nonscientific descriptions and explanations. Insofar as science itself is descriptive and eschews all normative concepts, it would seem that there is no room for any normatively governed phenomena in Sellars’s scientific realism. On the other hand, Sellars is committed to the existence of at least one major kind of normatively governed phenomenon: persons. I have argued that persons have a distinct kind of reality that I call practical reality. In this chapter I explain why Sellars’s own approach to ontology is compatible with the idea of practical reality, what kinds of things have practical reality, and why persons have practical reality.
Sellars’s quest for a comprehensive philosophy led him to consider the possibility and desirability of somehow fusing or joining two distinct ‘images’ of humanity-in-the-universe: the manifest image of common sense and the scientific image that has come to rival it. Against this, Rorty urges a conception of “vocabularies” that we use to engage in self-fashioning and self-transformation. I argue that we should reject the identification of the manifest image with common sense in order to make room for what Rorty calls “abnormal discourses.” Abnormal discourses play an important role in how we change our conception of what we are. However, I agree with Sellars that the scientific image does tell us something about how things really are. I conclude that we should not want to fuse or join the two images, because they have distinct roles to play in human life.
It is widely accepted that it counts for a metaphysical theory when the theory is in accord with common sense and against a metaphysical theory when the theory clashes with common sense. It is unclear, however, why this should be the case. When engaging in metaphysics, why should we give common sense any weight? This chapter maintains that it is only against the backdrop of a particular metametaphysical stance that questions about metaphysical best practices become tractable. From the perspective of a metaphysics-as-modelling approach, common sense ought to play a significant, though defeasible, role in metaphysical theorizing. According with common sense is one of a number of theoretical virtues that metaphysicians should strive for. Nevertheless, it is important for the metaphysician to be cautious when appealing to common sense. She should distinguish what actually falls within the bounds of common sense as such from what a particular researcher happens to find intuitive. Furthermore, our best scientific theories may undercut the evidence provided by common sense. Finally, the metaphysician should attend to the context in which she invokes common sense. For some topics of inquiry, common sense ought to play a more expansive role in our metaphysical theorizing than for others.
The discoveries of the new science of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries offered unique challenges to philosophers concerned with answering scepticism or with defending common-sense beliefs. This chapter focuses on how Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley took up those challenges. Descartes’s philosophical project brought to the forefront the tensions embedded in the confrontation between common sense, science, and scepticism. His insistence on raising the strongest sceptical doubts and on answering them with absolute certainty often left common-sense beliefs behind. Confronted with this result, and perhaps also with Descartes’s own failure to answer the sceptic, Locke weakened both the force of his own scepticism and the degree of certainty he demanded in his philosophical views. Moreover, he was often willing to privilege common-sense beliefs over arguments conflicting with them. In these ways, he provided a system which reconciled common sense, science, and scepticism more adequately than Descartes. Berkeley, convinced that his predecessors’ work left the sceptic unscathed, developed views which, he claimed, completed this reconciliation project. But the chapter shows that his views fall short of this goal. The work of these philosophers put in place the foundations upon which later thinkers would tackle this reconciliation challenge.
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