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This chapter seeks to examine and further clarify the relationship between two main conceptual approaches to causality in psychiatric research: counterfactual and mechanistic. The author suggests that psychiatry may pose some relatively unique challenges for causal inference not shared with other branches of medicine. At their core, counterfactual approaches ask “what if” questions while mechanistic approaches ask “how” questions. The chapter also seeks to evaluate the Russo-Williamson Thesis for psychiatric research, which argues that causal inference requires evidence of counterfactual and mechanistic causal effects, by examining three research papers that examine causal effects on psychiatric disorders. Two of these are from epidemiological samples and employ counterfactual methods, and one is from molecular genetics and molecular neuroscience and utilizes a mechanistic approach. Kendler argues that these two methods are complementary and often mutually reinforcing. In particular, the demonstration of counterfactual evidence of causation naturally raises the question of how such an effect occurs at a mechanistic level. However, the author suggest that the Russo-Williamson Thesis is too high a threshold for psychiatry and that, in at least some cases, high-quality counterfactual evidence can be actionable.
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