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Japan’s pursuit of counterstrike capability exposes tensions between the self-defense limits in Article 9 of its constitution, the evolution of an exclusively defensive defense posture, and international legal standards. Expanding self-defense to include counterstrike requires reconciling constitutional constraints, strategic necessity, and strict tests of necessity and proportionality under Article 51 of the UN Charter. These pressures show that counterstrike is not a technical upgrade but a fundamental challenge to Japan’s legal identity, strategic doctrine, and credibility in the Indo-Pacific.
This article examines how the Constitutional Courts of Lithuania and Latvia manage tensions between the security obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the human rights commitments under the European Convention on Human Rights. While both courts recognize state security obligations as legitimate justifications for state-secrets governance, the Lithuanian Court’s earlier development of ECHR-grounded constitutional jurisprudence prior to its NATO accession has produced more rights-protective outcomes than the Latvian Court in the domain of state-secrets governance. However, the Latvian Court afforded a higher level of rights protection following the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Ternovskis v. Latvia (2014). Building upon the case study, I advance a path-dependent thesis: prior internalization of ECHR norms creates a self-reinforcing framework that structures the function of security obligations in constitutional adjudication, while constitutional courts that lack this prior framework require an external shock to achieve similar results. Furthermore, this article identifies constitutional courts as pivotal sites of transnational norm harmonization: they construct the hierarchical framework through which multiple international obligations are organized within the domestic constitutional system, facilitating national policies and the operation of international organizations whose obligations are so ordered.
This chapter sets the scene for the book. It examines the resurgence of citizenship deprivation in liberal democracies and situates this within the context of wider academic debates on the evolution of citizenship since the end of the Second World War. Highlighting differences in state practices, it asks: how can we account for this revival of citizenship deprivation? What explains ‘resistances’ to this revival and variation between state practices? More broadly, what do we learn about citizenship deprivation when we read it through a constitutional lens? The chapter then outlines the main theoretical frameworks – the politics of (un)belonging and the constitutional state – and explains how these will be used to answer the aforementioned questions. In presenting these frameworks, the chapter highlights a gap in citizenship studies which the book aims to fill: the rare connection between states’ constitutional structures. The chapter concludes by presenting the methodology and methods employed, explaining why a historical inquiry into states’ practices of citizenship categorisation is needed, as well as why France and the UK were chosen as case studies.
Matthew Craven, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London,Sundhya Pahuja, University of Melbourne,Gerry Simpson, London School of Economics and Political Science
Chapter 7 explores how the proliferation of intelligence agencies during the Cold War brought into prominence the practice of international espionage, surveillance and covert intervention. As the 1960 U-2 incident exemplifies such practices were often the subject of significant contestation as to their legality in time of peace. Whilst the practice of surveillance was encouraged by an expanded concept of ‘national security’ it was often accompanied by a paradoxical commitment to secrecy. As secrecy intensified, public awareness of covert activities grew, and alongside it, accompanying practices of plausible deniability and ideological disavowal that undermined trust not just in public knowledge but in the possibility of legal judgment. We recount how contestation over the legality of espionage led, not only to a blurring of the categories of peace and war, but to the formation of a new legal framework for outer space that provided legal cover for ongoing surveillance to be undertaken by the rival Cold War powers. These developments profoundly impacted international law, sovereignty concepts, and global surveillance practices, shaping modern notions of global policing through surveillance and leaving a complex legacy in international relations.
This essay asks if the war and society approach needs reinforcement to fully capture the history of the Cold War. Both within the United States and around the globe, the Cold War was many wars: a theoretical war of nuclear threats; an armed and active conflict; a covert war; and a domestic crusade. Is a war and society framework adequate to describe a conflict of such dimensions? This essay probes the interpretive possibilities of adding a war as society frame to buttress the war and society approach. Focusing on the American Cold War’s geographies (where was it fought?), its warriors (who fought it?), and its timelines (when did it begin, and did it actually end?), I explore the myriad ways in which Americans experienced a multi-front and seemingly permanent war. Policymakers wanted everyone to be drafted into some kind of service for the Cold War, but Americans ultimately rejected that call. They could support a national security state to conduct the war, but they ultimately wanted a healthy distance from the battles. They sought coexistence–war and society–not fusion–war as society.
This paper examines how the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) are emerging as pivotal actors in the global race for frontier AI dominance, and analyzes the implications for U.S. strategic interests. It evaluates each country’s current position in the frontier AI development and deployment supply chain – detailing the UAE’s and KSA’s massive investments in AI infrastructure and connections with the USA, China and France – as well as the two Gulf states’ unique advantages in capital, energy and centralized governance. Gulf investments are reshaping global tech supply chains and could either strengthen or undermine U.S. technological leadership, depending on U.S. engagement. The paper recommends a proactive U.S. strategy to leverage Gulf AI ambitions while safeguarding national security. Recommendations include enforcing rigorous technical safeguards on Gulf-based AI infrastructure, tightening export control oversight to prevent diversion of advanced chips, joint targeted R&D investment initiatives, co-development of international AI standards, strict investment screening via the Committee on Foreign Investment in the USA and measures to prevent conflicts of interest.
For the third time in a century, the concept of critical minerals has become a central theme in international trade and security debates. Materials criticality discourse first arose in the late 1930s and 1940s. It was taken up again from the mid-1970s through to mid-1980s and has become ubiquitous in post-pandemic debates concerning the global energy transition in a context of escalating geopolitical volatility. This article examines the evolution of critical minerals discourse over a century, with a focus on these three periods. It seeks to identify the contexts in which criticality claims have emerged and to examine the politics of critical minerals discourse in this third wave. It argues that critical minerals discourse has evolved in response to geopolitical instability understood by the US to threaten its hegemony; and that critical minerals discourse in its third wave has thus far served four major political functions. First, critical minerals discourse has served as a rhetorical device for asserting that the security of the US and its allies lies in the defence of US hegemony, and not in the defence of international institutions and trade norms. Second, critical minerals discourse has served as an effective means of leveraging geopolitical instability in favour of extractive interests. Third, critical minerals discourse has worked to re-mystify the economics of market speculation and the predictability of state intervention in markets. Finally, critical minerals discourse has been used to leverage the existential urgency of the climate crisis in favour of elite and extractive interests and against local communities and ecosystems.
Data privacy and protection are inextricably intertwined, whereas the former often slides into a national security concern. Amid geopolitical tensions, the U.S. aims to preserve TikTok’s independence and prevent its use in cognitive warfare. The landmark case presents potentially groundbreaking trade-offs for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and the balance between data privacy and national security. The TikTok ban can be seen as a Catch-22 situation, presenting a Hobson’s choice for both the U.S. and China in the ongoing data war. The U.S. faces national security concerns regarding Chinese influence over the app’s data and its potential use for surveillance and propaganda. Conversely, banning TikTok risks setting a precedent for censorship and digital platform manipulation, undermining the U.S.’s long-standing commitment to free speech and open markets. The dilemma lies in whether to prioritize national security over the principles of free expression and open trade or to accept the risks posed by adversary-owned platforms operating in the U.S. This decision underscores rising tensions as the two powers grapple with data governance, digital sovereignty and geopolitical rivalry – an outcome that will shape global data governance and the technological landscape for years to come. A paradox emerges as China’s ideological aims and the U.S.’s technical concerns converge on a cutting-edge global challenge, that is, cognitive warfare in shaping global discourse and public opinion. This study examines how these conflicting forces shape TikTok’s quest to become a global platform, delving into the root causes of these tensions and exploring strategies to address the associated challenges.
This chapter analyses security exceptions in international trade law, focusing on their interpretation and application within the World Trade Organization (WTO) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs). It examines the evolving nature of national security concerns, particularly in cybersecurity, and how these concerns intersect with trade regulations. The chapter discusses the justiciability of security exceptions, the level of deference accorded to states in defining their security interests, and the challenges posed by the expansion of security concerns beyond traditional military domains. It also evaluates the adequacy of existing WTO and PTA frameworks in addressing contemporary security issues, suggesting that further innovations may be necessary to balance trade liberalisation with national security imperatives in the digital age.
This chapter examines the relationship between geopolitical rivalry and world trade law. It begins by discussing the consequences of trade for national power and security, and how dominant states approach foreign economic policy. It then analyses recent geopolitical developments and their implications for the evolution of the international economic order. It concludes by discussing the implications of the analysis for world trade law and policy in the future.
This final chapter looks broadly at the remaining years of the twenty-first century and the start of the twenty-second. Considered are the implications of a world population in 2100 that approaches or exceeds 10 billion. Some, if not all, of these musings may appear dismal to many. Most certainly the world facing monumental population and environmental challenges. Some of them are addressed in this chapter. There are also demographic implications for governance and civil society, national security, human rights, and international relations. The world is witnessing enormous advances in technology. Both population and noetic exponentialism are becoming even more problematic. The era of the Industrial Revolution is long over. The world is now experiencing the Information Revolution. Population size and change are in the middle of this incredible phenomenon.
How do competing political projections, economic motives, and security rationales inform infrastructural policy? How do state actors project infrastructural imaginations into the future when they perceive the present to be under duress? This article examines these questions by looking at Turkey’s infrastructural development from the late Ottoman period to the early Cold War through archival research and fieldwork. In this article, I argue that state actors can clash over the objectives, disposition, tempo, and modality of infrastructural development and opt for policy choices that may seem counterintuitive from the perspective of theories that treat infrastructure as a force multiplier of state power and identify in the state an insatiable and uniform drive for infrastructural power. These clashes are framed as contestations over infrastructural ideology and shows how state elites may consciously pace, manipulate, and even withhold infrastructural development in national territories, particularly in light of crisis perceptions and conditions. It claims that contests over infrastructural ideology arise from the recognition that infrastructure is ambivalent and can accommodate different power projections. In tracing Turkey’s infrastructural development since the Ottoman era and the gradual consolidation of centripetal preparedness as the state’s predominant infrastructural ideology, the article demonstrates how unorthodox forms of infrastructural policymaking under crisis conditions can entrench spatial fragmentations and skew the distribution of resources and life chances across national space and populations.
This chapter examines China’s evolving governance of international marriages through the lens of sovereign concerns, focusing on border stability, population management and national security. It explores how material and affective processes inform the regulations and representations of marriage migration to China. The discussion shows how the Chinese state continually revises its administrative and legal framework for international marriage, and also highlights the historical, racialised and gendered forces embedded in this process. The argument contends that the regulatory framework of marriage migration is shaped by shifting ‘structures of feeling’ that define belonging in Chinese society. These intersecting spheres of state affective and regulatory practices reveal new power dynamics and inequalities in China’s relations with the outside world.
This Chapter conceptualizes security exceptions under international trade and investment agreements. In particular, it seeks to construct the chain that links trade and security-related issues arising from the application of security measures by clarifying the concept of national security to be used for the book, revisiting the current role of international organizations in balancing free trade and national security, ie the UN and the WTO, and finally contemplating the decision to incorporate security exceptions into international economic agreements or the decision to adopt security measures through the lenses of economic contract theory, the theories of international relations, such as realism, institutionalism, and constructivism, and the concept of securitization.
This chapter provides an overview of the economics of terrorism and social media. Recent advances in the economics of information and economics and psychology help summarize the literature on how terrorism and social media interact. I discuss the implications of the transition from mass media to social media for terrorism in general before describing the impact of social media on the industrial organization of terrorism in particular. I also summarize recent work on the impact of terrorism on social media as well as the economics and psychology of national security have provided some solutions. Overall, social media has been an important part of the industrial organization of terrorism as well as its undoing where progress has been made. What we do not know (but ought to know) include topics such as how social media strengthens or weakens anti-terrorism initiatives given newer developments such as encryption and whether or not terrorist cyber-attacks may increase in importance over time as social media grows in scale.
The deployment of 5G has raised diverse national security concerns, leading to policies restricting Chinese companies’ participation in this critical infrastructure. This chapter examines these policies against the background of international investment law, focusing on restrictions against Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE. It evaluates the compatibility of these measures with international investment agreements and explores potential violations of national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, and full protection and security standards. The chapter also discusses the justification of these policies under national security exceptions, concluding that international investment law may not be fully equipped to address the evolving geo-economic landscape.
This chapter investigates the role of science and technology as a function of the history of the World War II effort to transform national security resource and acquisition under Vannevar Bush at MIT, its effects upon American society as President Eisenhower warned the nation in 1961, and the later forces of globalization, the knowledge economy and accelerating emerging and disruptive science and technology as applied to war and terror today. Important is our understanding of our application of a specific logic to war and terror after 9/11; forward deployment of American military power overseas and homeland security (defense of the homeland) for the purpose of understanding the rapid evolution of technological capability in achieving outcomes. Furthermore, we will look more specifically at emerging science and technology as a particular area of technological innovation that stems from research and development phenomena that is tasked to provide outsize national security, specifically counterterrorism deliverables for the United States.
National security concerns have long shaped international relations, with economic interdependence traditionally seen as fostering stability. However, recent geopolitical shifts have challenged this assumption. The strategic rivalry, particularly between the US and China, has raised the stakes of international competition and new forms of economic warfare. Historically committed to multilateralism, the EU faces pressures to reassess its approach due to an increasing use of economic coercion by other states. Emerging powers, particularly BRICS, are also redefining their roles in the global order, employing economic tools to counter Western hegemony. As unilateralism rises and the effectiveness of multilateral institutions like the WTO is questioned, a “new geo-economic order” appears to be emerging. This Chapter creates the basis for the normative and evaluative questions of this book by exploring how major economic players navigate national security concerns in an increasingly fragmented trade landscape.
This book offers a timely and insightful exploration of security exceptions in international trade and investment law, focusing on the growing tension between national security measures and global economic stability. Through in-depth analysis and case studies of major global players, it uncovers how current practices are shaping international trade governance. The book examines the challenges posed by overly broad or narrow security exceptions, proposes practical reforms to improve legal clarity, and suggests ways to enhance cooperation between international organizations like the WTO and the UN. Aimed at policymakers, legal professionals, and scholars, this book provides valuable recommendations to help navigate the evolving landscape of global trade, offering concrete solutions to balance national security concerns with the need for economic cooperation.
Chapter 6 is devoted to the topic of Variable Interest Entity (VIE), which is widely used for overseas listings of Chinese companies. The legality of VIE has long been a subject of intense debate in China due to its alleged circumvention of China’s foreign investment law: The VIE structure allows foreign investors to participate in overseas-listed Chinese companies through contractual control rather than a shareholding relationship, thus bypassing relevant restrictions on foreign investment in China. This chapter argues that China adopts a policy of strategic ambiguity about the legality of the VIE structure, so as to balance the need to protect national security and the need to facilitate overseas listing of Chinese companies. There are institutional reasons behind this policy, including interest group politics of regulatory agencies and the rent-seeking activities of regulatory officials. The policy of strategic ambiguity will likely continue in the foreseeable future, and so will the uncertainty over the legality of the VIE structure.