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This chapter explains the spatial distribution of IB activities from a geography-centred perspective. It begins with classical trade theories of absolute and comparative advantage, revisiting factor endowments and productivity differences as core explanations for cross-border specialization. The analysis then moves beyond resource-based accounts to incorporate institutional and structural determinants of locational attractiveness. The chapter introduces Porter’s diamond, institutional quality, industrial agglomerations, and global cities as key drivers of competitive advantage. It also examines supranational frameworks such as regional economic integration and their impact on cross-border investment decisions. By distinguishing systematically between supranational, national, and subnational levels, the chapter shows that locational advantages are multilayered and embedded in broader economic, political, and social contexts. Overall, it demonstrates that explaining why certain territories attract high-value IB activities requires integrating insights from economic geography, institutional theory, and competitiveness research.
The chapter examines the two branches of New Trade Theory (NTT). The one spearheaded by Krugman claims lineage to Smith, Marshall, Young and Ohlin. In models that explain trade in a differentiated consumption good, each monopolistic firm’s production involves a fixed cost but nothing there extends DoLop analysis. Expressing his interest in Economic Geography, the modelling of external economies likewise also did little to shed light on DoLop. Though he sought to rehabilitate high development theory, he followed the standard characterisation of less-DCs as having mistakenly adopted import-substituting IPs while resigning to the fact there is nothing in NTT that could yield useful reformulations of those policies. Ethier developed a branch that initially referred to Smith and Young, though for modelling convenience that quickly gave way to multiple yet undifferentiated inputs, with a portrayal of their trade among similar countries. Jones and Kierzkowski were inspired by Ethier to pioneer production fragmentation studies and they even tried to add a dynamic flavour by suggesting possible horizontal aspects of vertical fragmentation, although that has not attracted research interest.
In this chapter, I introduce the concept of intra-industry trade, discuss measurement issues, and trace its rise in the postwar period. Next, I present descriptive statistics on sector- and country-level patterns in intra-industry trade, demonstrating that it tends to occur most intensively among differentiable manufactured goods and among developed economies that specialize in the production of these goods. Third, I discuss the economic rationale for intra-industry trade, drawing on the work of economists who pioneered new trade theory by explaining why countries with similar factor endowments would trade for similar goods. Fourth, I discuss the distributional effects of intra-industry trade and the contributions of new–new trade theory to the crucial point that intra-industry trade causes resources to reallocate within industries, rather than across industries. I present an extended example of these effects through discussing the effects of trade liberalization between Canada, Mexico, and the US.
Unlike the industrial policies of other countries, which are mostly guidelines, China’s industrial policy is more like a corporate strategy that approves/disapproves projects and mobilizes the country’s resources to help its firms achieve dominance. Due to its size, the effects of China’s industrial policy have a powerful global impact. The general pattern of its industrial policy is that the state identifies certain industries and determines them to be high priorities. Once an industry is designated as strategically important, the state will mobilize all necessary resources from across the country to develop this industry. The state will pick some domestic firms as national champions, and erects barriers to foreign firms entering the industry. With a large, protected domestic market, the designated firms will be able to quickly realize the necessary scale and to lower unit production costs. Once the designated domestic firm becomes efficient, the state will support it as it goes out and dominates the world market. The cases of electronic vehicle batteries, solar panels, and high-speed rail are used to show how China’s industrial policy helps its firms to gain global dominance.
This chapter provides an introduction to the phenomenon of intra-industry trade in both its horizontal and vertical varieties. It introduces the monopolistic competition model of intra-industry trade, a central model of new trade theory. It discusses the smooth adjustment hypothesis, and an appendix introduces the Grubel–Lloyd index of intra-industry trade.
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