To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter examines why most Russians trust state-controlled media over independent news sources, even as they acknowledge the political bias of the former. Drawing on an online survey and a large-scale source reputation experiment, it shows that trust in propaganda outlets is deeply rooted in political orientations: Putin supporters overwhelmingly trust state television and other state-controlled media, perceiving them as accurate and patriotic, while extending little credibility to independent outlets. Opposition-minded citizens are considerably more skeptical of propaganda but often still consume and trust state news agencies. The chapter demonstrates that state media’s perceived credibility boosts belief in propaganda stories by 2–5 percentage points—a modest but cumulatively significant effect. It also examines how citizens justify trust in biased media and why common news literacy practices, such as cross-checking with other sources, can backfire in state-dominated information environments, where coordinated propaganda reinforces itself across outlets. Together, these findings explain why independent journalism struggles to attract audiences in autocracies: the Kremlin’s service propaganda cultivates genuine loyalty among supporters, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of consumption and trust that independent reporting cannot easily break.
This chapters turns from the supply side to the demand side and examines what sorts of news people get and how much of it they get from what sources. The chapter also considers evidence about news avoidance, echo chambers and mixed diets as the factors underlying the use of news from different sources.
This chapter opens with a review of the dangers of misinformation and conspiracy theory beliefs. We then review the literature on debunking techniques, highlighting why debunking is largely ineffective at combatting QAnon and other conspiracy theories. Although corrections are largely ineffective, repeated corrections, warnings, and alternative accounts for misinformation can improve their effectiveness. In contrast to debunking, another approach is “prebunking”; trying to prevent conspiracies rather than counter them. Based on inoculation theory, Banas and Miller (2013) found that both fact-based and logic-based messages delivered before a conspiracy film helped build up participants’ resistance to that message. Next, this chapter discusses the role of media literacy in the QAnon—and other more general—conspiracies. Research has indicated that greater news media literacy relates negatively to beliefs in conspiracies (Craft et al., 2017). A brief discussion of how QAnon is similar or different from other groups is offered, along with some research questions for future study about QAnon specifically.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.