This chapter is a quest for objective standards that would govern (i) the taking of evidence and (ii) the presentation (admissibility) of evidence, along with the weight to be accorded to such evidence. It undertakes this analysis within the framework of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (the IBA Rules). The IBA Rules are constructively critiqued, in part, because they employ definitions that are operational and not substantive. This want of objective nomenclature leads to a relativistic single standard for both (i) the taking and (ii) the presentation (admissibility) and weight of evidence. It is asserted that foundational concepts such as “relevance” and “materiality” must be imbued with objectivity in order to remove the indeterminacy that arises from an otherwise relativistic and ad hoc standard. The IBA Rules are compared and contrasted to provisions from the US federal evidence rubric.

Chapter 5 introduces practical methods for assessing the outcomes of polyvagal-informed strategies. Despite the emergence of various approaches to measuring the outcomes of different psychology interventions, there are still significant obstacles when assessing the efficacy of polyvagal-informed approaches. To rectify these issues, this chapter recommends several approaches for assessing the outcomes of polyvagal-informed interventions, placing the focus on four types of measures: (1) objective measures, (2) behavioral observation, (3) subjective reports, and (4) standardized psychological assessments. Healthcare leaders can compare the strengths and weaknesses of these measures to determine which offers the best assessment.

Chapter 10 questions whether law should widen its lens to address general appearance discrimination too. Would a protected characteristic of appearance offer viable legal rights to the many millions of us who do not have a disfigurement but are less-than-beautiful in some way? For example, is appearance objective enough to be adjudicated in law? Is a clear distinction between mutable and immutable aspects of appearance important – or even possible given increasing medico-cosmetic opportunities to change the way our bodies look? Do we have an unobjectionable nomenclature to describe appearance and attractiveness in legal terms? And could we swallow well-meaning employers’ attempts to measure the attractiveness of their staff for the purposes of diversity monitoring? The discussion draws on examples of comparative laws in France and America. Both countries have adopted wider conceptions of appearance equality, and America’s laws have seen a recent period of growth, with Binghampton, New York, the latest to vote such a law onto its statute books in 2023. However, both sets of laws remain little used so far, despite evidence showing that appearance discrimination remains prevalent. How could we ensure that a protected characteristic of appearance in the UK avoided a similar fate?

Any type of asset can be tokenised, i.e., registered on a blockchain or other type of distributed ledger technology (DLT). Hence, the resulting cryptoassets take many forms, including currency/payment tokens, security/financial/investment tokens, and utility tokens. The technology offers new opportunities for issuers, investors, and the financial system at large but also challenges, including some new risks in addition to those already known by conventional financial systems. The EU regulatory framework for cryptoassets seeks to address these challenges while facilitating innovation and competition across the European Single Market. These rules have evolved since the EBA’s 2014 recommendations on AML/CTF provisions through the 2018 FinTech Action Plan and the 2020 Digital Finance Package. This has now resulted in an updated AML/CTF framework, the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA) as a bespoke piece of financial regulation to fill gaps in existing EU financial law, the Pilot Regulation as the EU’s “regulatory sandbox” for DLT market infrastructures, and the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) that promotes cybersecurity in the financial sector.

This chapter develops a novel theory of meaningful work that is informed by the politics of working life perspectives and grounded in Critical Realism’s stratified theory of the human being. This combination allows us to identify the structural constraints and enablers of meaningful work as objective dimensions of meaningful work that interact with agential responses that we term subjective dimensions of meaningful work. Approaching meaningful work in this way promotes an understanding of meaningful waged work as a dynamic continuum that emerges from the interplay of its objective and subjective dimensions. The objective and subjective dimensions identify autonomy, dignity and recognition as the central pillars of meaningful waged work. The first part of this chapter recapitulates the relationship between structure and agency and establishes the key parameters of the stratified social ontology of human beings that guides our undertaking. This displays how the interplay between the structure, which is represented here as the objective dimensions of meaningful work, and the agential responses to it, encapsulated in the subjective dimensions of meaningful work, culminate in the experience of different forms of meaningful work or its absence.

Once the Court has established that an interference with a Convention right meets the requirement of lawfulness, the second main requirement for the interference to be justifiable is that it pursues a legitimate aim. The express limitation clauses of the Convention further do not only require the aims pursued to be legitimate, but they also provide exhaustive lists of the aims which can legitimately be served. Although the test of legitimate aim does not play a large role in the Court’s review of justification for restrictions, this Chapter addresses the application and interpretation of the legitimate aim requirement. Special attention is paid to the situation of a discrepancy between stated and real aims and the situation where more than one aim is pursued. In addition, Article 18 ECHR is discussed, which states that restrictions cannot be applied for any other purpose than that for which they have been prescribed. The Merabishvili case and the requirements defined therein are central to this discussion.

This chapter defines the basic principles of planning within a context of management science. It describes how plans are used for managing modern operations.

Throughout his life, W. B. Yeats used the terms ‘tragedy’ and ‘comedy’ in relation to the theatre.However, it is clear that his understanding of these terms did not derive from Aristotle.He also frequently mentions Nietzsche, and particularly Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy; however, he uses Nietzsche’s theory of tragedy in an unique and distinctive way.For Yeats, tragic theatre was what he referred to as 'subjective', a term he develops in his occult and philosophical works, particularly A Vision, and which he relates to vision, thought, and the individual.'Comedy', by contrast, is what Yeats considers to be 'objective', concerned with the material world and its manifestations, including the body, and rationality.Based on this opposition, Yeats lays the foundations for a theory of theatre that is distinctive, and which shapes his own theatrical practice.

The two main justifications for punishment, and the ones most relevant for pecuniary sanctions are retribution and deterrence. This chapter aim to theoretically assess day fines in light of these two justifications. Whereas day fines seem to fit well the deterrence goal, their legitimacy in light of the proportionality principle (mostly attributed to retribution) is less straight forward. A fine, which accounts not only for the severity of the offence, but also for the income of the offender, has a better potential to deter all criminals irrespective of their income. On the other hand, such fine might not seem to be proportional to the severity of the crime if also income is accounted for, thus not fulfilling the retribution goal. However, if looking more broadly on the principle of proportionality, one can see day fines are more proportional than fixed fines. The number of days is the element which needs to be proportionate to the severity of the offence. The daily unit, on the other hand, assures that the imposed punitive bite of the sanction is similar for all offenders irrespective of their income. In addition to this analysis, this chapter discusses the theoretically optimal model of day fines.

Carrying out the innovation creation and delivery plan that was created in the first execution stage is the aim of this final level of The Innovation Pyramid. Launching new innovations has challenges beyond those of a typical internal-company project in that they generally involve collaborators and adopters outside the innovation-creating organization. This means that multiple environments and multiple points-of-view, in addition to the innovation-creator's internal environment and point-of-view, must be appraised. A modification of Drucker's core management-by-objective framework is introduced to assure alignment of all the people and activities associated with the plan's successful implementation.

The remainder of the chapter focuses on performing a post-execution variance evaluation of the plan's implementation. Such a review allows the implementation team to hone in on the learnings attained from carrying out the developed plan. All four aspects of the plan are reviewed: Operations, Delivery, Resources and Risks. A poor plan execution does not automatically mean the implementation team underperformed. The issue may lie with people or environments well beyond the core team.

When Amartya Sen defends his capability approach to well-being, he contrasts it with the utility theory advocated by the classical utilitarians, including John Stuart Mill. Yet a closer examination of the two views reveals that they are much more similar than they appear. Each can be interpreted in either a subjective or an objective way. When both are interpreted subjectively the differences between them are slight, and likewise for the objective interpretations. Finally, whatever differences may remain are less important than they might seem, since the two theories are developed by Sen and Mill for different purposes and, in that sense, are not genuine alternatives.

It is critical to understand the political objective or aim for which the war is being fought. These aims can be offensive, such as seizing a piece of a neighbor’s territory, or defensive, meaning holding what one has. This gives us a firm analytical foundation and the why of the war. One must understand the value each combatant places on the objectives because this helps determine the nature of the war, how long it will be fought, where, and at what cost. But we must remember that the objectives can change. Sometimes this is good. Sometimes this is bad. Leaders must understand when this happens and the effects, because changing the objective means you have embarked upon a different or even a new war and thus changed its nature. For example, the US changed from a limited to an unlimited objective during the Korean War when it decided to destroy the North Korean regime and unify the peninsula. In Iraq in 2003, the US fought the war to overthrow Saddam’s rule – an unlimited aim – but was soon fighting to prop up the new government it had established – a limited, defensive aim. The political aim determines everything.