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For Kant, ‘applied ethics’ is a critically grounded ethics of the human being. Continuing the argument of the previous chapter, this chapter proposes that inquiry into Kant’s engagement with Stoic philosophy would more profitably focus on applied rather than pure ethics. As Kant conceives of applied ethics as a ‘doctrine of virtue’, and glosses his own so-designated project in the 1797 Metaphysics of Morals as ‘doctrina officiorum virtutis’ (6:381), the chapter considers the relation of Kant’s account to the Stoic notion of officium as appropriate action. In this context it introduces the Stoic doctrine of oikeiōsis, the process by which all living beings develop awareness of and affinity for their natural constitution, and act appropriately. This doctrine offers Kant a conceptual framework for considering the developmental aspects of human ethics. The chapter concludes by considering the teleological argument about human development in Kant’s 1784 Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim as a work applied ethics in a wider sense, and indicates how it plausibly emerges from Kant’s critical engagement with the canonical Stoic account of human development.
The Stoics have sometimes been credited with concern for appropriately moral motivation, based on their distinction between those actions they classify as appropriate (kathēkonta) and those they characterize, in addition, as done on the basis of virtue (katorthōmata). This chapter argues that the Kantian and Stoic views closely resemble one another in this respect: just as Kant’s motive of duty requires a singular interest in the rightness of dutiful action, so the Stoics suppose that virtue and actions that originate in virtue are the only objects of fully rational desire. Both theories recognize, as well, that many of our cognitions are not transparent to ourselves, so that we are often unaware of our own motives. This recognition speaks to the depth and complexity of Stoic intellectualist psychology and underlies Kant’s claim that the effort to understand our own moral condition is a “wide” duty of virtue.
This chapter argues against a dominant reading of the Stoics according to which all appropriate actions (kathēkonta), whether drinking when thirsty or standing firm at a critical juncture in battle, count equally as “duties” (officia). All scholars interpret the Stoic Sage’s perfection to imply that absolutely every token action of the Sage counts as a (morally) perfect action (katorthōma), with the result that there is no category of actions constituted by the morally permissible. Appreciating the significance of the misunderstood Stoic category of “intermediate appropriate actions,” however, makes clear that there are actions that follow nature, but that are simply concerned with pursuing “promoted indifferents.” Thus, it is argued that the Stoic position recognizes a class of permissible actions – even for the Sage, whose perfection consists rather in never acting contrary to virtue. The Stoics are thus much closer to Kant and their Socratic heritage than has been previously recognized.
The concept of a ‘formula’ (Formel) plays an important, if complicated, role in Kant’s ethics, especially in the Groundwork. The concept of a formula also plays an important role in Stoic accounts of moral reasoning in the Latin sources, Cicero and Seneca. This chapter explores the place and function of this concept in Stoic ethics and its origins in Roman legal theory and practice. It then raises the question of the relationship between the Kantian and Stoic uses of the concept, asking whether this is a case of direct influence of Stoicism on Kant’s moral philosophy. The chapter comes to no definite conclusion on the question, but aims to provide comparative materials that may help others to address the question.
Although it is widely recognised that many concepts central to Kant's ethics have a Stoic provenance, there has still been relatively little close scholarly examination of the significance of Stoic ethics for the development of Kant's philosophy over the Critical period and beyond. This volume brings together an intellectually diverse group of scholars from classics and philosophy to advance our understanding of this topic, taking up questions about the transmission of Stoic philosophy in Kant's intellectual context, the quality of Kant's own understanding of Stoicism, his transformation of some of its central ideas, and the topic's significance to what remains vital about Stoic and Kantian ethics today. The volume will interest those working on the history of philosophy, the nature of rationality, the philosophy of action, moral psychology, and virtue theory.
Embassy lies at the heart of Christianity. Recall the archangel Gabriel, sent as God’s messenger to Mary in the village of Nazareth. This event alone, described in Luke’s Gospel (1:26–37) and represented in lively pictures and sculptures innumerable times, is enough to remind us of the long historical connection between Christianity and diplomacy. And so it is no surprise that, as a specific literature on the ambassador began to develop in early modern Europe, the analogy between diplomats and angels was very frequently used. The roots of this analogy can be traced back to the writings of the Jewish thinker Philo of Alexandria († c. AD 50), and to the biblical Letter to the Hebrews (1:14), traditionally credited to Paul. It was from the late Middle Ages onward, however, that the analogy really gained currency, in parallel with the development of diplomatic theory and practice.
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