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The Byzantine reaction to the establishment of the Latin states in the wake of the First Crusade is puzzling at first sight. In themselves, the kingdom of Jerusalem, the principality of Antioch, the county of Tripoli and the county of Edessa posed no direct threat to the empire. On the contrary, they were potential allies against the Armenians of Cilicia, the Danishmendid Turks of Sebasteia and the Seljuk Turks of Ikonion, the enemies that the Byzantines would have to subdue if they were to restore their control over the areas of Asia Minor lost in the years after the Battle of Manzikert in 1071. Nevertheless, successive Byzantine emperors devoted considerable energy and resources to an attempt to bring the Latin states under their authority, leading three major military expeditions into the area. Some recent commentators have been perplexed by this apparent diversion from what might be regarded as the main task of reconquering Asia Minor and have interpreted it as part of a wider expansionist strategy that was designed to bring the empire’s frontiers up to the Euphrates.
Why are the nine years of destructive invasion and attempted conquest of Scotland unknown to English literary criticism? This chapter shows why we have forgotten this unusually brutal invasive war of 1542–1550 and why it matters to remember it. It introduces the ‘British history’ of Geoffrey of Monmouth, through which English kings claimed feudal overlordship of Scotland. It shows how Henry VIII deployed Geoffrey’s history in his Declaration of 1542 to justify invasion, but also how Henry’s rhetoric and strategy disavowed any desire to conquer in the pretence that he was reluctantly forced into reminding the Scots of English overlordship. Such rhetoric, subsequently repeated and reprinted, helped both justify English claims and trivialise the war to the point of oblivion in modern English historiography. The chapter reads a neglected Scottish text by William Lamb which, opposing Henry’s claims by appealing to the law of nations, exposes the precarious fictionality of English claims to overlordship and its lack of credibility in a broader European context.
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