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In this chapter I reconstruct core commitments of Brandom’s recent A Spirit of Trust in terms of a radically nominalistic process metaphysics. This is necessary in order to evade the following dilemma: on the one hand, Brandom argues that determinate semantic content entails modal realism. But modal realism is not compatible with Sellars’s nominalistic metaphysics. Hence, we either need to abandon nominalistic metaphysics or determinate semantic content. I argue that the key to avoiding this dilemma lies in supplementing Sellars’s process metaphysics with Deleuze’s concept of “the virtual” and by taking more seriously Sellars’s concept of “picturing” as a nonnormative mapping between cognitive states and the environment. On this basis I reconstruct Brandomian semantics as explicating how language appears in the lifeworld, but not how we should conceive of language in the scientific image. I conclude by suggesting that recent work in the predictive processing theory of cognition can shed further light on how picturing should be understood.
Sellars’s long-neglected account of “picturing” has recently found more sympathetic interpretations. At the same time, there has been more sustained engagement with Sellars in terms of Kant. However, there has not yet been an inquiry into the role that “picturing” played in debates amongst nineteenth- and twentieth-century neo-Kantians prior to Sellars. This chapter examines how neo-Kantians such as Helmholtz, Riehl, and Hertz used the concept of picturing in theorizing both scientific philosophy of mind and adjudicating debates between realism and idealism. Thus Sellars belongs to a rich and complicated tradition in his own use of the concept to address both problematics.
Despite some notable similarities between the scientific realisms of Sellars and Peirce (such as both being anti-representationalist and future-directed), in his mature work Science and Metaphysics, Sellars explicitly critiqued Peirce’s account of truth as lacking “an intelligible foundation” (SM: vii). In this paper, I explore Sellars’ proposed remedy to Peirce’s purported lack, in his complex and enigmatic account of picturing – a non-discursive ‘mapping’ of the world. I argue that although Sellars’ development of this idea is largely sound, much of what he charges Peirce’s philosophy with missing is actually present there. By means of his semiotic icon/index/symbol distinction, Peirce manages to develop a philosophy of language which effectively coordinates the real order and the order of signification within the very structure of the proposition as he understands it, by contrast to Sellars’ claim that the two orders are merely connected by ‘analogy’. I also argue that in between Sellars’ ambitious account of veridicality, which appears to anticipate a form of scientific self-mensuration, and the dismissive ‘anti-truth’ quietism of neopragmatists such as Rorty, Peirce’s “contrite fallibilism” (Peirce CP 1.14) charts a wise middle path.
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