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Hans Kelsen was one of the first major legal and political thinkers to argue that political parties are indispensable to democracy. This chapter deals with an important but largely overlooked aspect of Kelsen’s thinking about parties, which will be called party constitutionalism. In short, party constitutionalism refers to the idea that party organisations should be regulated by constitutional norms in order to ensure that parties are democratically organised. Kelsen developed this idea at a time when constitutions had little to say about the status of parties, and even the normative desirability of the party form was contested. After reconstructing Kelsen’s case for party constitutionalism, the chapter turns to the question of how the constitutional regulation of parties has evolved in the second half of the twentieth century. It is argued that even in countries where constitutions prescribe that parties must be democratically organised, intra-party democracy has rarely flourished. However, the sobering reality of party constitutionalism should not blind us to the lasting importance of Kelsen’s observation that democracy is ill served by elite-dominated, oligarchic parties. In fact, Kelsen’s work can help inspire a broader conversation about how parties should be organised and how their internal life can be regulated.
At the conclusion of World War II, the Western victors found that the defeated peoples of Germany and Japan ready for a return to the comparative liberalism of the 1920s. In the meantime, there was an emerging conflict—the Cold War—with another victor: the Soviet Union. Soviet support of a military invasion of South Korea by the Communist North in 1950 provoked unwarranted fears of an imminent World War, and these were taken to require the assemblage of a vast arsenal of weapons designed to deter a war that neither side had any intention of starting. The Cold War also came furnished with a set of alarming crises. In the most famous, the Soviets sought in Cuba to solve two problems that essentially didn’t exist: a potential US invasion and a strategic “imbalance” that was irrelevant because neither side had any intention of initiating a nuclear exchange whatever the disparity of the arsenal. But leaders on both sides were successful at keeping the crisis from escalating. Even if the missiles had been installed in Cuba, however, the only consequence would be that, like other nuclear forces, they would have spent the next decades gathering dust.
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