To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Chapter 5 discusses a number of potential objections to the transactions cost approach to competition law. For example, it might be claimed that the concern about hold-up is captured under the concept of ‘dynamic efficiency’ or that this framework can be incorporated into the concept of consumer welfare. This chapter also deals with concerns that the transactions cost approach may focus on the protection of competitors or that the implications of this approach are already recognised in the literature. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications for the sunk investments of the dominant firm as opposed to its trading partners and a discussion of whether the proposed approach would require a large change in competition law enforcement practice.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.