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Chapter 2 further articulates the normativist view, but its central task is to demonstrate its effectiveness; that is, to illustrate the eliminativist aspect of normativism by showing how normativists dissolve three central problems in the philosophy of mathematics. It first deals with the problem of the specialness of mathematical propositions, traditionally considered necessarily true. Then it tackles the so-called Benacerraf dilemma, the (supposed) difficulty of knowing mathematical truths – but before that, it clarifies the notion of a pseudo-problem as understood by Wittgenstein. In the last sections, the chapter dissolves a third problem, the traditional ontological question ‘do mathematical objects exist?’ More concretely, it tackles three incarnations of realism: traditional platonism, Fregean logicist realism, and the species of realism due to Quine and defended on the basis of indispensability considerations.
This final chapter provides a summary of the book, together with some additional clarifications. Along the way, I will highlight several open questions and difficulties faced by the present account – and, if the account offered here is accurate, by Wittgenstein’s own position.
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