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This chapter applies free will skepticism to the realm of criminal justice, challenging the moral legitimacy of retributive punishment. If no one is morally responsible in the basic desert sense, then the practice of punishing wrongdoers because they deserve it is unjustified. The chapter begins by defining punishment and distinguishing legal punishment from other forms. It then presents two arguments – the skeptical and epistemic arguments – for rejecting retributivism. The author proposes an alternative model: the public health-quarantine model, which treats serious criminal behavior not with moral blame but as a threat to be contained for public safety, akin to quarantining carriers of contagious disease. This model is forward-looking, emphasizing rehabilitation, prevention, and social support rather than desert-based harm. It aims to reduce recidivism and address the social determinants of criminal behavior, such as poverty, trauma, and lack of education. The chapter also addresses objections and argues that belief in free will sustains punitive attitudes, obstructing reform. Rejecting such beliefs can foster more humane, effective, and just approaches to crime. In place of retribution, the public health-quarantine model offers a compassionate framework that prioritizes safety, healing, and systemic change.
The free will skeptic aims to articulate a theory for treatment of criminals that rejects retributivism, since this justification for punishment is inconsistent with the skeptic’s outlook, but nevertheless actually works in the real world. In past versions of such an account I’ve emphasized the quarantine analogy for incapacitation together with the value of rehabilitation and reintegration (Pereboom 2001, 2014), and I’ve endorsed Gregg Caruso’s embedding of the view within a public health model (Caruso 2016, 2017; Pereboom and Caruso 2018). Recently I’ve paid special attention to the permissibility and the limits of special and general deterrence (Pereboom 2017b, 2019). Here I set out this view and develop it in certain key respects in response to the latest objections raised against it.
The free will skeptic aims to articulate a theory for treatment of criminals that rejects retributivism, since this justification for punishment is inconsistent with the skeptic’s outlook, but nevertheless actually works in the real world. In past versions of such an account I’ve emphasized the quarantine analogy for incapacitation together with the value of rehabilitation and reintegration (Pereboom 2001, 2014), and I’ve endorsed Gregg Caruso’s embedding of the view within a public health model (Caruso 2016, 2017; Pereboom and Caruso 2018). Recently I’ve paid special attention to the permissibility and the limits of special and general deterrence (Pereboom 2017b, 2019). Here I set out this view and develop it in certain key respects in response to the latest objections raised against it.
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