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This chapter reconceptualises EU competition law as an interpretive and argumentative practice rather than a technocratic, value‑neutral regime. It starts from the observation that persistent indeterminacy and reasonable disagreement about core antitrust concepts (restriction of competition, abuse of dominance, effective competition) are not temporary defects, but structural features of a field animated by conflicting yet plausible views about what competition is for. Traditional responses, whether top‑down axiomatic projects that seek a single master value (such as consumer welfare) or bottom‑up doctrinalism that trusts incremental case law development, share a commitment to economic formalism and legal positivism, and thus miscast indeterminacy as a technical gap to be closed by better models or more refined doctrine. Drawing on interpretivism and “law as integrity”, the chapter develops an Argumentative Practice Model in which legal content emerges from the dynamic interplay of value judgements, doctrinal reasoning, and extra‑legal knowledge. Through case‑based analysis on agreements and abuse of dominance, including digital markets and refusal‑to‑supply scenarios, it shows how doctrinal shifts are intelligible only as interpretive moves that renegotiate the purposes of competition law. Embracing this argumentative character, the chapter argues, is essential for epistemic openness, adaptability, and normative legitimacy in a changing economy.
The success of a democratic society depends, Rawls thought, on members having a shared sense of justice, a common basis for reasoning about what is right. Otherwise, disagreements born from conflicts of interest and identity – and associated “distrust and resentment” – will have corrosive effects on social cooperation. But can we reasonably hope for a broadly shared sense of justice? Religious and philosophical pluralism arguably leave hope for an overlapping consensus on a conception of justice sufficient to cabin those corrosive effects. But what about the pluralism of conceptions of justice themselves? I argue that, even on favorable assumptions about people and social cooperation, we should expect serious disagreement about conceptions of justice and the forms of democracy they recommend, as well as conflicts between and among the interests and identities of citizens who endorse those competing conceptions. Even on these favorable assumptions, then, we have reason to worry – as I think Rawls always did – about the fragility of democracy.
Chapter 2 illustrates how material necessity reflects a two-fold truism that it is in each belligerent’s strategic interest to do what is necessary and to avoid what is unnecessary. The notion evaluates how the means taken advances the ends sought under the prevailing circumstances. A given act can be a military necessity compared to some alternatives, yet a non-necessity compared to some other alternatives. Acts that are wasteful, excessive, inapposite, futile or purposeless are improvable military non-necessities rather than solely the results of war’s irresistible friction. The necessity assessment of particular action cannot be meaningfully generalised or seen outside of its factual context.
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