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This chapter explores how Rwandan President Paul Kagame has used transnational repression (TR) to maintain regime security by targeting perceived domestic enemies abroad. Kagame’s government uses surveillance, spyware, harassment, intimidation, assassination, and even military intervention to silence critics in the diaspora, especially political opponents, Hutus, former regime officials, and ex-military members. TR is facilitated through official institutions like the Diaspora General Directorate and embassies, as well as through partnerships with host countries, especially authoritarian ones. While Kagame’s regime is praised internationally for successful economic growth and peacekeeping efforts, this masks its authoritarian control, domestic suppression of dissent, and ongoing militarism in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The West’s failure to hold Rwanda accountable stems from guilt over the 1994 genocide and Rwanda’s strategic value in African peacekeeping and resource access. As Kagame reframes authoritarian measures as necessary for national unity and security, his global diplomatic expansion enables continued repression. Rwanda’s TR undermines global human rights norms and Kagame’s authoritarianism, enabled by Western interests, threatens both domestic freedoms and regional stability.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) engages in transnational repression because it perceives the diaspora as a potential threat to the internal stability, regime security, and ideological legitimacy of its authoritarian regime. Transnational repression is aimed principally at silencing members of the “defector diaspora” and their supporters abroad. As part of a broader securitization of diaspora management, North Korea’s transnational repression seeks to dissuade citizens from fleeing; to discredit those abroad who criticize the regime or work against its goals; and to deter and disrupt diasporic opposition. Specific activities include border security to limit out-migration; forced repatriation, including highly publicized, coercive "redefection" for state propaganda; rhetorical threats; cyber-repression for intimidation and coercion; and assassination. Use of extraterritorial violence, in particular, has had geopolitical consequences; Pyongyang has arguably modified its activities and made them more covert, rather than halting them altogether. Because it is so closely tied to the pursuit of regime security, transnational repression by the DPRK seems unlikely to disappear, and presents key policy challenges for the democratic governments in which the main targets reside, especially South Korea.
Oil has seriously impacted the institutional development of the state in the Arabian Peninsula. More specifically, the sudden and unprecedented acquisition of massive oil revenues resulted in the freezing of the state’s formal and informal institutions, at the point at which petrodollars were injected into the state’s coffers. From then on, state leaders were able to deploy the state’s wealth to dictate the pace and direction of institutional change. Over time, any institutional change has been directed towards enhancing regime security, and the pace of change has been calculated and deliberately slow. Any political opening has been dictated by the logic of state power maximization (in relation to society). At the same time, partly to ensure its popular legitimacy and partly through the vision of its leaders, the state has deployed its massive wealth both to foster rapid economic and infrastructural development, and to enhance the living standards of its citizens. In other words, whereas oil may have stunted institutional development –– i.e., an institution’s curse –– it has been an economic blessing.
A key source of CPC power is its control of the armed forces, which it can mobilize not just for national defence but also to preserve the regime. This chapter examines the CPC’s evolving relationship with its military wing – the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In previous decades the PLA has enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from the CPC’s civilian leaders. The Central Military Commission (CMC), which oversees the armed forces, has maintained a status commensurate with the Politburo, partly as a result of the fragmentation of control mechanisms. Since coming to power Xi Jinping has worked to bring the armed forces under his direct authority, but it remains unclear the extent to which direct control mechanisms can be institutionalized. This chapter examines the new features of CPC–PLA relations in the Xi era.
Chapter 1 presents an introduction to the book’s main research question and an overview of its overarching argument. It also situates the book’s argument within the existing literature on threat perception within the IR discipline and engages critically with realism, constructivism, and regime security approaches. In the discipline of International Relations (IR), threat perception has been a constituent element in the study of alliances. The Middle East region provides a rich pool for empirical puzzles in the study of threats and alliances. The existing literature on threat perception and alliance formation has been divided between those favouring ideational forces and those favouring material forces as drivers of threat perception. This book sheds new lights on this debate by addressing the conditions that can explain when ideational forces will be predominant in states’ fear of another and when material forces will be decisive. The chapter also outlines the cases studies employed in the book. It gives an overview of the comparative case studies of Saudi and Syrian threat perceptions and alliance choices during three wars in the Middle East: The Iran–Iraq War (1980–8), the 2006 Lebanon War, and the 2009 Gaza War.
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