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This introduction to Part II explains why the WCC shifted toward a “liberationist” human rights agenda in the late 1960s and 1970s. One key factor was Cold War détente, which opened up space for criticism of the Cold War deadlock and the superpower interventionism it supposedly justified. Another was decolonization, which contributed to a global reconfiguration of Christianity. These enabled the rise of the New Left, which favored grassroots activism over bureaucratic structures and projected hopes for political renewal onto the Third World. While often overlooked because of the simultaneous process of secularization, especially in Western Europe, religion played an important role in the ferment of the 1960s. Liberation theology, emanating above all from Latin America, inspired much of the WCC’s new agenda, which was defined by its overtly political positioning against liberalism and alignment with socialism and especially anti-imperialism. The WCC’s course contrasted with the liberal rights agenda of Amnesty, the statist agenda espoused by postcolonial leaders promoting a New International Economic Order, and the anticommunism of more conservative actors, like US evangelicals.
This chapter sketches the secularization process in the German music historiography of Beethoven during the Nineteenth Century, and how it became a dominant narrative that side-lined voices of other scholars, such as August Wilhelm Ambros and Ludwig Bischoff. In particular, the chapter explores the role of Eduard Hanslick in the context of German unification and the conflict between his supporters and the New German School. Hanslick’s espousal of an imageless formalism was designed to “free” sacred music from “ecclesiastical trappings” so that it could override the cultural diversity of the German-speaking lands – particularly the confessional divide between north and south—with an overarching purely instrumental aesthetic fit for a concert hall. Thus, in the battle betw – en Hanslick’s formalism and the New German School, religious music was ironically in the progressive camp as exemplified by the religious music of Liszt; but with Wagner’s adoption of Schopenhauer – the first important philosopher to see himself as an atheist – the aesthetic of the New German School turned new music into its own art religion and consign Christianity to the backwaters of historical progress.
This chapter traces some common Enlightenment narratives of Beethoven and the problematic role that sacred music plays in defining what is included or omitted as “Enlightenment” in terms of its social, political and philosophical identity. These narratives, however, sit uncomfortably with the Missa solemnis and have resulted in some strange narrative maneuvers within Beethoven scholarship that not only skew the historical context but our image of the composer. The chapter ends by exploring an approach that tries to square “the Enlightenment” with the circle of sacred music without simply reversing the narrative of a progressive Beethoven with a reactionary one: religion is a radically creative force for Beethoven and his Enlightenment belief in “freedom and progress.”
This chapter endeavors to make sense of Japanese religiosity and to unravel how it has formed an undercurrent in Japanese society. First, it focuses on the characteristics of traditional religions that took hold in premodern Japan: Shinto, Japan’s native religion, and two imported religions, Buddhism and Christianity. The chapter then analyzes newer religions founded in the twentieth century and scrutinizes the more recent emergence of a cultural trend in which individuals seek spirituality outside established religious spheres. It looks at this-worldly financial and political activities of these old and new religions, then sketches how the general trend of secularization faces the revitalization of religious practices.
Chapter 4 discusses Iran’s religious diversity. It examines the two main sects of Islam (Sunnism and Shiism) and describes their expressions in Iran. Of the world’s many Muslim-majority nation-states, Iran is one of the few Shi‘i-dominant ones. Safavid rulers proclaimed Shi‘i Islam as the state religion in 1501. Shi‘i clergymen declared a Shi‘i Islamic republic in 1979, after the popular revolution that ousted the secular monarchy. Iran features multiple kinds of religious communities. They include a wide range of Shi‘is and Shi‘i-related peoples, ethnoreligious minorities, Sunni-dominant minorities, and non-Muslims who are Bahais, Christians (Armenians, Assyrians, Chaldeans), Jews, Zoroastrians, and Mandaeans. The chapter discusses the positioning of religious minorities within the fundamentalist Shi‘i Islamic republic and the changes that have occurred for them since 1978. Iranians who are not mainstream Twelver Shi‘is are not well integrated in Iranian society. Shi‘i Muslims since 1978 also underwent changes in doctrine and practice. Iran’s new “religious” minorities include growing numbers of secularists and others who reject the ruling Shi‘i regime and its restrictive politico-religious ideologies and programs. They threaten the regime’s stability and longevity.
What is the impact of income on secularity? Why does higher income lead to greater secularity in some contexts but not others? I argue that the answer lies in the long-term political consequences of direct colonial rule. Challenging conventional wisdom on secularization, I advance a macro-historical account in which colonial intervention reshaped the social meaning of secularity among higher-income groups. In societies subjected to direct colonial rule, secularity became associated with foreign imposition and elite collaboration, generating postcolonial resistance among the affluent. Consequently, higher income does not predict greater individual secularity in these contexts. By contrast, in societies never directly colonized, economic elites historically spearheaded modernization projects that incorporated secularization, producing a positive income–secularity association. I test this argument using 351,960 observations from 269 countries over three decades (1989–2022) in the World Values Survey, alongside additional evidence from the Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Dataset.
This chapter presents El Evangelista (1877–1886), the first Protestant, Spanish-language newspaper in the Río de la Plata region of Argentina as well as two articles that appeared in El Estandarte (1883–1901) and El Atalaya (1901–1909). These publications were among the most influential journalistic organs that Protestants used for the initial dissemination of their ideas in the port cities of Buenos Aires, Rosario de Santa Fe, and Montevideo in the period 1870–1900. Using these sources, this chapter analyzes how the anti-Catholic discourse wielded by Protestantism contributed to a growing crisis of meaning by questioning Catholic society, its mediations such as the miracle of the mass, prayers for the dead, relics, the cult of saints, the monastic way of life, and its agents. This challenge aimed to establish a religious reformation that would introduce a new moral order to the society and culture of the region.
Political crises play a pivotal role in shaping political secularization across sub-Saharan Africa. Côte d’Ivoire, located in the heart of French-speaking West Africa, exemplifies how such crises can catalyze secularist dynamics at the political level. From the early 1990s through the 2020s, especially following the near-overthrow of the government by armed rebels in 2002, it became increasingly apparent to many politicians that institutional religious leaders, both Christian and Muslim, should step back from political involvement. This process of secularization, driven by politicians, remains confined to the political sphere and has yet to permeate broader society and culture. This paper is based on fieldwork and data collected in Côte d’Ivoire between 2017 and 2020, including interviews, archival material from political parties, major newspapers, and religious organizations. Resources from the Pew Research Center further inform this research.
Chapters 8 and 9 recount group interactions during the final three island times, leading to RA’s deliberate dissolution and reorganization. Unlike previous chapters, these chapters use a first-person, present-tense narrative to closely examine management issues and group dynamics during the last RA meetings and to reaffirm findings presented earlier in the book. Throughout these meetings, RA struggled to manage the transition from a close-knit group of friends to a formalized organization while retaining its foundational social practices, idioculture, and relationships. The group underwent a secularization process and became polarized over future directions. These chapters depict a group grappling with powerful sociological forces in tension with one another and trying to maintain effective collaboration and decision-making as the conditions for effective group decision-making eroded. Ultimately, RA lost its adaptive capacity and became stuck in a resilient yet undesirable state, leading to the decision to disband and seek new pathways to transformation. My own role in RA also comes to the foreground when during pivotal moments of interaction group leaders asked me to provide guidance based on my research, which consequently shaped their decisions and RA’s future.
Chapters 8 and 9 recount group interactions during the final three island times, leading to RA’s deliberate dissolution and reorganization. Unlike previous chapters, these chapters use a first-person, present-tense narrative to closely examine management issues and group dynamics during the last RA meetings and to reaffirm findings presented earlier in the book. Throughout these meetings, RA struggled to manage the transition from a close-knit group of friends to a formalized organization while retaining its foundational social practices, idioculture, and relationships. The group underwent a secularization process and became polarized over future directions. These chapters depict a group grappling with powerful sociological forces in tension with one another and trying to maintain effective collaboration and decision-making as the conditions for effective group decision-making eroded. Ultimately, RA lost its adaptive capacity and became stuck in a resilient yet undesirable state, leading to the decision to disband and seek new pathways to transformation. My own role in RA also comes to the foreground when during pivotal moments of interaction group leaders asked me to provide guidance based on my research, which consequently shaped their decisions and RA’s future.
The prevalence of religious beliefs and practices is puzzling from an evolutionary perspective, but previous research has suggested that religious traditions may provide cooperative benefits and improve well-being. Seemingly in contrast to this claim are worldwide secularization trends in which people disaffiliate from religions and abandon belief in God. Theorists have suggested that diminished pressures on cooperation and well-being no longer motivate individuals to seek religious benefits and pay the associated participation costs. We investigate this claim using the National Study of Youth and Religion dataset, which tracks the development of religiosity among US Christians from adolescence to young adulthood (n = 3,370). Using a lagged panel design, we found that material security in Wave 1 (early adolescence) predicts a decrease in belief in God in Wave 4 (young adulthood), although this association is rather small. This result provides some support for the hypothesis that participation in religious traditions is associated with living in an insecure socio-ecology, where religious systems may still confer benefits on their members; yet it is not the only driver of secularization. We conclude with a call for further research using more nuanced measures and larger sample sizes to provide deeper insights into the potentially adaptive nature of cultural systems.
Research on volunteering has emphasized the positive role played by individual religiosity on this type of civic engagement. There are fewer studies on the relation between contextual religiosity and volunteer work. Several of them have concluded that the higher the macro-contextual religiosity, the higher the propensity to get involved in volunteering. Thereby, researchers might be inclined to conclude that secularization is a threat to this social participation. This article shows that such a conclusion is unfounded. From a data set including the 27 countries of the European Union and using a multilevel analysis to control for the compositional effects of the national sample, we obtain a negative correlation between macro-contextual religiosity and volunteering. From these results, we suggest that the relationship between volunteering and contextual religiosity cannot be considered as deterministic but it has to be comprehended in a more global cultural context.
Religion is now politically active in ways that until recently were unthinkable. Both in Europe and elsewhere in the world, there are numerous examples of how religion has left its previously assigned place in the private sphere, becoming in some cases an important contributor to various political issues, conflicts and competitions. To understand what has happened in this regard necessarily involves a remodelling and re-assumption of our understanding of the public roles of religious actors. Until the 1960s or 1970s, theories of secularization had long condemned religious actors in both Western and non-Western countries to social and political marginalization. Secularization theory maintained that as countries modernized, religion would lose its public centrality. But, as this did not happen, there is now a need to rethink the public role of religion. This article is concerned with this issue, with a focus on Europe, using democratization, democracy and civil liberties as key examples.
During the last three decades Dutch church attendance rates dropped considerably, while the relative share of volunteers in non-religious organizations decreased at a slower rate. This is an unexpected development given the positive association between religious involvement and volunteering. In this article, we try to account for this development by addressing the following question: Why has a massive and ongoing decline of church attendance in the Netherlands not resulted in a similar drop in the relative number of volunteers in non-religious voluntary organizations? In view of this question, we wonder if the negative effect of declining church attendance on volunteering is perhaps counterbalanced by a positive effect of educational expansion. Our findings reveal that this is indeed the case, but these counterbalancing effects are only modest.
The nation and the Church are never far apart in Europe. The Westphalian state-system defined allegiance and loyalty to the state as correlates of religious conformity. The re-emergence of religious conflict in Europe is the paradoxical result of globalization and individualization. The new social meaning of faith compels courts, governments, and the general publics to re-examine the old stability pacts between the national Churches and states. The belated secularization of the state is the likely outcome.
Abstract: This chapter understands modernity’s fragmented and contradictory secular modernities through the prism of the state of nature accounts of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. It offers a new taxonomy of the varieties of modern secularization in terms of deflationary, collateral, and psychologizing imaginaries.
The state of nature is a powerful idea at the heart of the fragmented and sometimes conflicting stories the modern West tells about itself. It also makes sense of foundational Western commitments to equality and accumulation, freedom and property, universality and the individual. By exploring the social and cultural imaginaries that emerge from the distinct and often contradictory accounts of the state of nature in the writing of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, The State of Nature and the Shaping of Modernity offers a fresh perspective on some of the most pressing debates of our time, showing how the state of nature idea provides a powerful lens through which to focus the complex forces shaping today's political and cultural landscape. It also explores how ideas about human nature and origins drive today's debates about colonialism, secularism, and the environment, and how they can shed new light on some of society's most heated debates.
Edited by
Martin Nedbal, University of Kansas,Kelly St. Pierre, Wichita State University and Institute for Theoretical Studies, Prague,,Hana Vlhová-Wörner, University of Basel and Masaryk Institute, Prague
This chapter traces the development of choral singing in the Bohemian lands throughout the nineteenth century. Civic choral activities in Bohemia began taking shape in the 1840s, ultimately playing a central role in nationalization processes. However, the mass nationalization tendencies faced setbacks in the 1870s due to economic problems and political crises, delaying the full reconfiguration of the Czech choral movement on an ethnocentric principle until the late 1800s. At the same time, even by the end of the nineteenth century, most German-language choral societies maintained regional affiliations established in the 1860s, rather than embracing ethnic ties. Furthermore, choral activities were influenced by the emergence of the industrial working class. During this period, choral endeavors were also affected by the contradictory impulses to view choral singing as both a social activity and an artistic endeavor.
American culture is evolving rapidly as a result of shifts in its religious landscape. American civil religion is robust enough to make room for new perspectives, as religious pluralism is foundational for democracy. Moreover, as Amy Black and Douglas L. Koopman argue, American religion and politics are indivisible. In this study, they interrogate three visions of American identity: Christian nationalism, strict secularism, and civil religion. Whereas the growth of Christian nationalism and strict secularism foster division and threaten consensus, by contrast, a dynamic, self-critical civil religion strengthens democracy. When civil religion makes room for robust religious pluralism to thrive, religious and nonreligious people can coexist peacefully in the public square. Integrating insights from political science, history, religious studies, and sociology, Black and Koopman trace the role of religion in American politics and culture, assess the current religious and political landscape, and offer insights into paths by which the United States might reach a new working consensus that strengthens democracy.
The worldwide scope and depth of the present international system and its sense of legitimacy have not been applied in the same way everywhere. There is still much diversity among countries and the courses of action and the policies that they embrace. This explains, in part, the tensions and disagreements concerning the nature and dynamic of this international system as well as the claims of legitimacy in it. The redistribution of power currently underway at the international level, epitomized by the rise of China, could create more stress in the future. Nevertheless, overlooking the scope and depth of the present international order and its culture of legitimacy would be a mistake. The scope and depth of the present international order and its culture of legitimacy are the manifestations and the products of the following elements working together: position of power dominance, means of penetration and integration, values and norms, and secularization and democratization.