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This chapter is centred on the tension between public funding and public health, and on how decisions about resource allocation can shed light on the state’s intention about practices to select against disability. This is particularly relevant in relation to the broader analysis of eugenics in this book, because a eugenic intention might seem more likely if there is a state intention to avoid the higher costs of health and social care for disabled people. Although the mere fact that the parents of disabled children bear additional costs might not be sufficient evidence of eugenics, a more revealing examination of the state’s intention can be made through a comparison of different funding decisions. The chapter also examines two areas of decision-making where cost calculations might be relevant: in relation to decisions about public funding for the prenatal detection of Down syndrome, and to decisions about the treatment of very ill infants. While explicit cost–benefit analysis might seem to be ethically unacceptable, this analysis could nevertheless be an implicit consideration, and the concealment of this consideration could constitute a form of manipulation.
This Introduction sets out the book’s central aim, and it also provides an overview of the main arguments with summaries of subsequent chapters. The starting point for this book is that there is a need to test a common assumption about the widespread use of techniques and procedures used to prevent the birth of a disabled child: that in a modern liberal state this practice is mainly or solely a matter of individual choice, and that the state itself is neutral. Further, it might be assumed that this neutral stance would allow the modern liberal state to maintain its stated commitment to equality, and that it provides a shield against any charge of eugenics. The Introduction begins to explain how this common assumption will be tested, by reference to interpretations of a neutral state intention. It also emphasises the book’s original contribution: while there is already extensive literature on the ethics of selecting against disability, this book is distinctively centred on an analysis of the state’s position.
This Conclusion sums up the main arguments in the book, addresses some final questions, and suggests some future directions of travel. In particular, it returns to the eugenics question, and examines whether current practices in modern liberal states might be in line with a type of eugenics that does not involve state coercion, but that rather involves manipulation, and chiefly the manipulation of women. It also emphasises how an analysis of individual choice should be a secondary concern in our approach to the ethics of selecting against disability, and that the position of the state should be our starting point. The last part of the chapter offers additional reflections on the topic of starting points, and on the importance of thinking further about the nature of pregnancy.
This chapter addresses a number of foundational issues in relation to the position of the modern liberal state and the use of techniques and procedures that can prevent the birth of a disabled child. It begins by explaining why the traditional approach to the ethics of selective reproduction is insufficient as it usually sidelines or minimises the role of the state, following on from a common assumption that the state is neutral. It then considers the meaning of a liberal commitment to neutrality, so that we can analyse and question this common assumption. Among other things, the chapter claims that the relevance of the role of the state is not limited to the use of coercive measures, and that we should focus on state intention. Although neutrality can be a matter of degree, and while there are different interpretations of a neutral state intention, the chapter suggests that the position of the state can be assessed by reference to certain central liberal commitments. In particular, the chapter examines the importance of individual choice as an essential commitment of the modern liberal state, and considers what choice should be available to prospective parents.
While Chapter 1 was focused on the importance of reproductive choice for the modern liberal state, this chapter examines whether a liberal commitment to neutrality would require that the state place certain constraints on choice, for the benefit of the future child. The chapter begins by considering a hypothetical scenario put forward by Bruce Ackerman, where decisions are made by a Master Geneticist according to a liberal commitment to neutrality, and then analyses arguments made by proponents of liberal eugenics. In so doing, it scrutinises a number of complexities surrounding a state concern for the interests of the future child. A first set of complexities relates to the nonidentity problem, given that it is not clear that a liberal state should be concerned with the interests of a hypothetical replacement child. A second set of complexities relates to the gendered impact of the state’s concern for the child, and to the risks involved for women’s bodily integrity and equality.
Throughout the world, in liberal states, it is common to use prenatal selection techniques and procedures which can prevent the birth of a disabled child. A common assumption is that this practice is driven by individual choice, and that the state itself is neutral. If instead the state was not neutral, this would raise fears of eugenics. The purpose of this book is to test this common assumption. While there is extensive literature on the ethics of selecting against disability, this book proposes a different starting point based on an analysis of the state's position. Through an examination of liberal theory, and a review of concrete examples of state practice, it sheds new light on our society's commitment to the equality of disabled people and the equality of women.
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