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This chapter introduces no-regret learning with predictions, and introduces optimistic online mirror descent. Then, we show that self-play in two-player zero-sum games with optimistic and stable online learning algorithms leads to a 1/T rate of convergence to equilibrium.
This chapter introduces the idea of computing a two-player zero-sum Nash equilibrium via “self play,” where two no-regret learning algorithms play against each other. We prove that the uniform average of the iterates converges to a Nash equilibrium. Then, we introduce several practical tricks for speeding up self-play, including linear iterate averaging and alternation.
This book presents a modern introduction to the field of algorithmic game theory. It places a heavy emphasis on optimization and online learning (a subdiscipline of machine learning), which are tools that increasingly play a central role in both the theory and practice of applying game-theoretic ideas. The book covers the core techniques used in several majorly successful applications, including techniques used for creating superhuman poker AIs, the theory behind the 'pacing' methodology that has become standard in the internet advertising industry, and the application of competitive equilibrium from equal incomes for fair course seat allocation in many business schools. With its focus on online learning tools, this book is an ideal companion to classic texts on algorithmic game theory for graduate students and researchers.
We set out an alternative, “top down”, approach to agent-based modeling. We develop an artificial intelligence (AI) algorithm to navigate the governance cycle using what we can think of as computational game theory. AI models have had formidable success in solving games like Chess, Go, and especially a bluffing game like Poker, suggesting they also have the potential to attack difficult political games. Addressing a simplified version of the government formation process as a noncooperative game, the AI algorithm deploys Monte Carlo Counterfactual Regret (MCCFR). During in massively repeated self-play, it samples paths though the vast game tree to relentlessly learn near optimal strategies.
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