To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Why do citizens in autocracies believe state propaganda, even when its falsehoods are obvious? This introduction argues that existing explanations—persuasion, intimidation, and epistemic confounding—fail to account for how authoritarian media build credibility. The book advances an alternative framework: “service propaganda,” in which state-controlled media cultivate trust by serving pro-regime majorities. Authoritarian media reaffirm supporters’ identities and worldviews while meeting their informational needs, earning credibility—and making it easier to spread outright disinformation. This consumer-oriented approach is analogous to partisan media in democracies. Drawing on large-scale text analysis of Russian state television and extensive surveys, the book examines Russia under Vladimir Putin as a crucial case in comparative context. The introduction outlines the book’s contributions: reframing propaganda as a service to supporters, centering citizens’ role in co-constructing authoritarian narratives, and illuminating why independent journalism struggles to compete. It also previews implications for policymakers seeking to counteract propaganda in autocracies and beyond.
Why do Russians embrace propaganda narratives even when these narratives are costly, as in the case of the 2014 food embargo? This chapter examines the demand side of propaganda, arguing that Russians’ susceptibility to pro-regime messaging is best explained by politically biased news processing rather than state brainwashing or poor discernment capacity. Drawing on two original surveys in which thousands of Russian respondents evaluated dozens of real news stories, the chapter shows that Putin supporters are substantially more likely to rate pro-regime stories as true and critical stories as false—a difference of 10–15 percentage points compared to opposition-minded citizens. Yet when political cues are absent, supporters and critics demonstrate very similar capacity to distinguish true from false information, and overall, Russians’ discernment is close to international benchmarks. These findings suggest that pro-regime majorities’ receptivity to propaganda stems from the political congruence between propaganda content and their prior beliefs—a core mechanism of service propaganda—rather than from the coercive power of the state media apparatus. The chapter concludes by discussing why political biases reduce opposition-minded citizens’ resistance to critical information and why independent journalism faces deep barriers in authoritarian societies.
This chapter develops the book’s theoretical framework, explaining how state-controlled media sustain authoritarian rule by serving pro-regime citizens rather than imposing the regime’s will. The argument begins with a typology of autocratic regimes: fear dictatorships relying on coercion, competitive autocracies depending on persuasion, and consolidated regimes with large pro-regime majorities. In the latter—exemplified by Putin’s Russia—autocrats must maintain popular support, making state media a tool for public service rather than indoctrination. The chapter introduces “service propaganda,” drawing on the partisan media model. State outlets serve supporters through two strategies: reaffirming propaganda that validates their identities, values, and worldviews, and informative propaganda that creates a sense of being reliably informed. By catering to supporters, state media cultivate trust, reinforce existing beliefs, and reduce demand for independent journalism—providing a reservoir of credibility autocrats can draw on to promote radical policies. The chapter also identifies key trade-offs, including the tension between maintaining existing support and broadening it.
Why do millions of Russians trust state television even when its lies seem obvious? How Propaganda Wins offers a bold new answer. This book argues that authoritarian media doesn't just persuade or intimidate but it serves. Drawing on cutting-edge analysis of Russian prime-time propaganda reporting and extensive original surveys, the book introduces the theory of 'service propaganda,' the strategy of winning loyalty by affirming citizens' identities, validating their worldview, and meeting their everyday informational needs. The result is genuine trust that makes citizens receptive to disinformation, resistant to independent journalism, and willing to accept a brutal war. Comparing Russia to autocracies from China to Hungary, and drawing lessons that reach into democratic societies, How Propaganda Wins is a crucial account of how modern propaganda works and what it takes to fight it.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.