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Chapter 1 reframes how institutional investors exercise power and are held to account in a world shaped by financial intermediation, systemic risk, long-term value concerns, and evolving societal expectations. Tracing the evolution and limits of shareholder governance – including the rise of shareholder activism and the contested promise of shareholder democracy – it introduces the book’s central puzzle: how to institutionalise investor stewardship in ways that are normatively coherent, empirically grounded, and responsive to systemic interdependence. The chapter sets out a model of enlightened shareholder – and more broadly, investor – stewardship, defined by multi-level responsibility, plural accountability, and attention to ‘unseen others’, which reimagines institutional investors as custodians of capital across time, stakeholders, and systems. It outlines the book’s tripartite contribution – conceptual, empirical, and regulatory – and presents its analytical trajectory, interpretive framework, and institutional vision. Anchored in the UK but with global relevance, the chapter sets the stage for rethinking capital’s role in serving public and private interests.
Chapter 2 traces the evolving role of the shareholder across key theories and institutional shifts in corporate governance. It begins with a historical account of shareholder governance, from entrepreneurial proprietors to passive risk-bearers, before revisiting Berle and Means’ analysis of the separation of ownership and control. It then examines how post-war managerialism gave way to contractarian theories that reframed shareholders as holders of exit rights in a market-based governance model. Legal doctrines, voting rights, and market mechanisms reinforced shareholder centrality, despite its legitimacy remained contested. The chapter turns to the rise of institutional investors in the UK since the 1970s, marking a shift in the locus and exercise of shareholder power. Through this lens, it interrogates the normative assumptions underpinning shareholder governance and revisits the meaning of ownership and control in an age of financial intermediation. It sets the stage for reimagining investor stewardship not as a mere extension of agency theory, but as a form of institutionalised accountability, embedded in systems of power, responsibility, and public purpose.
This chapter argues that the legal architecture of the company obfuscates the political relationship between shareholders and employees and transforms captured value from employees into a transferable and fungible property form. It sets out this claim within a Marxian analysis of the political economy mapped onto the legal architecture of the company. Following on from this analysis, the chapter also demonstrates that recent initiatives that exhort shareholders to govern the company and to monitor company executives – through, for example, the rapidly proliferating Stewardship Codes – attempt to subvert the legal and economic nature of modern shareholders as rentiers, to ill effect.
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