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This chapter examines the major extralegal governance institutions employed by participants to secure cooperation and mitigate uncertainties in China’s small property right housing market, where housing is built on collectively owned land without legal title. Although illegal, these large-scale communities often house numerous immigrants and are consequently often tolerated by local governments. However, these governments may intervene in the market if they perceive threats to social order, the local economy, or government revenue. The small property right housing market is illegal but socially legitimate, making it a unique form of illegal market. Participants develop private institutions to facilitate exchanges, protect informal property rights, and avoid government interference. Empirical data shows that builders and buyers use informal documents, contracts, lawyer testimonies, and signing rituals to define ownership and assess the trustworthiness of exchange participants. Sellers utilize WeChat groups for information sharing and reputation management. Village committees perform multiple roles in the market: They act as builders, sellers, and third-party enforcers; they establish ownership and transaction databases to protect informal property rights; and they also organize collective action and seek political patronage to deter government interference.
This chapter provides a detailed discussion of the multiple case study design and our fieldwork in mainland China. It also explains the rationale behind the selection of the four cases: street vending, small property right housing, corrupt exchanges, and online loan sharks. The multiple case study design allowed us to utilize interviews, observations, and published materials to gain a comprehensive understanding of illegal markets as well as the extralegal governance institutions developed to promote cooperation and mitigate risks within these markets. The chapter outlines the process of informant selection, the challenges we encountered and how we addressed them, and the limitations of our empirical data.
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