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Hobbes argues that in a “condition of meer nature,” lacking a common power, reason requires that we appoint one, lest our lives be “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.” No covenant of peace can be effective without a Sovereign arbiter to enforce it. Therefore, reason requires each of us to surrender the natural right to judge for ourselves, and to appoint a Sovereign. An effective Sovereign must have authority to determine religious practice and to raise an army – precisely the powers the “Roundhead” rebels had denied Charles I.
Starting with three good ideas – natural equality, government resting on consent, and government limited by the terms of that consent – Hobbes derives distressing conclusions. Reason requires submission to the Sovereign even in matters of conscience. The Sovereign can do subjects no injustice. Mixed government must lead to civil war. This chapter traces and tests Hobbes’s reasoning.
Locke held that any number of persons might join together to form a government. He imposed no limitation on the knowledge or reasoning that joiners might make use of. It is likely that Locke imagined that governments typically arose by consensus among private landowners, who then by a majority vote chose the procedure by which the legislative power was to operate. It is safe to say that Locke did not favor a wide suffrage or democracy. Locke also did not insist on any strict separation of executive and legislative powers: Of necessity, the executive must have a “prerogative power” to further the common good even if contrary to legislation. The notions of an independent judiciary and judicial review of legislation are nowhere found in Locke. Locke did, however, advocate reform of the composition of Parliament to make it more representative. And he was defensive of the rights of commoners against enclosures – so, logically, he may have favored a wider franchise.
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