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Mid-century corporate executives received most of their compensation from salaries and cash bonuses, making them highly vulnerable to the top marginal income tax rates. Because executives were also able to negotiate custom pay packages, they adopted policies to dodge those rates. Most importantly, executives were influential in spreading and legitimizing tax dodging not only within their own companies, where they could affect the nature and structure of their own pay packages and those of their employees, but they could influence compensation, benefit and perquisite, and reimbursement policies at thousands more companies in part by lobbying for legislative and regulatory action that officially sanctioned these new policies. Although executive tax dodging was not the only reason corporations partnered with the government in creating the plans that form the backbone of our employer-sponsored retirement and health insurance systems, as well as the stock-based compensation that helped to drive the wealth and pay gap between executives and workers, it was a powerful force in a system that has endured for decades.
Stock options and equity-based pay are critical for executive and startup compensation. This chapter explores the roles of stock grants, restricted stock units (RSUs), and profit-sharing models in aligning employee incentives with company performance. It covers tax implications, long-term incentive plans, and common pitfalls in equity-based pay structures. The chapter provides practical insights into designing equity compensation programs that attract and retain top talent while maintaining financial sustainability.
The rise in executive pay over the last four decades correlates with the rise of corporate governance. This chapter shows that the explosion in executive compensation has mostly been due to the adoption of two “best practices” urged on boards by the modern corporate governance regime: (1) the use of equity incentives to align managers’ interests with those of the shareholders; and (2) the adoption of pay-for-performance schemes. A large body of empirical research suggests neither of these compensation practices produces better corporate performance; the research does show, however, that these pay practices lead to adverse outcomes, including fraud. The chapter concludes by discussing how modern corporate governance’s focus on controlling agency costs has blinded it to the many other roles executive pay must play in a well-run organization.
This chapter on executive compensation and stock options is effectively a continuation of Chapter 9 on performance pay. It provides an overview of executive compensation and an intuitive, non-technical treatment of stock options that focuses on the worker incentives that options create. There is a lot of discussion of risk (of income loss) that builds on Chapter 9, and the “pay for luck” discussion that ends the chapter concerns the possibility of firms’ reneging on CEOs’ bonus payments, which echoes the wage-theft themes from Chapter 2. Section 10.2 covers the executive bonuses known as “80/120” plans, representing them pictorially as nonlinear functions of a performance measure (that are upward-sloping in some parts, as in the performance-pay graphs of Chapter 9). The section on stock options is detailed and explains all of the key terminology and the most important concepts in this area. The distinction between the intrinsic value and the market value of an option is made carefully, with an intuitive, non-technical discussion of the Black–Scholes–Merton options valuation formula, and the role of risk is explained in detail.
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