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This chapter maps the background conditions that set India, Brazil, and Israel on a collision course between apex courts and elected branches. It first surveys court design and doctrinal evolution: India’s Supreme Court (PIL, basic-structure review, collegium, proportionality); Israel’s Supreme Court (abolition of standing/justiciability limits, reasonableness/proportionality, constitutional review via Basic Laws and – recently – striking down even Basic Laws); and Brazil’s Supreme Court (abstract review, expansive interpretation, and assertive criminal/prosecutorial powers). Across all three, anti-formalism, self-empowerment, and a liberal, cosmopolitan rights orientation expanded judicial reach before polarization surged. The chapter then traces polarization’s ascent alongside shifts in political hegemony: BJP dominance and Hindu nationalism in India; Likud-led, religion-inflected coalitions and anti-elite rhetoric in Israel; and Bolsonaro’s conservative, evangelical-backed populism in Brazil. Media fragmentation and social platforms amplify identity conflict, producing mass protests and, in Brazil, institutional assaults. Together, strong courts and sharp polarization generate recurrent executive–judicial clashes.
Courts are the focal point of our system of justice, from both a practical and an ideological perspective. From a practical perspective, courts stand ready to deal with disputes large and small, and to make authoritative decisions which can then be safely implemented in the real world. Ideally, those decisions represent justice, but even when this is arguable, the decisions are final and enforceable (or they can be appealed until a final and enforceable decision is made). From an ideological perspective, courts represent an impartial, usually publicly open place where arguments can be made and where each side can have their say, with the adversarial parties ultimately placing the judge in a position to make a fair decision, or, at the very least, a decision which emerges from a fair process. In Australia, there are literally dozens of courts, and similar bodies called tribunals. We can classify courts in three ways: according to their position in the court hierarchy, according to their jurisdiction, and according to their purpose. In this chapter, we will address all three of these ways of classifying courts.
There are two practices of constitutional review: the diffuse review by the judiciary with supreme courts as the final appellate body in common law countries and the concentrated review by constitutional courts outside the ordinary judiciary in civil law countries. Though we observe a tendency towards a convergence of diffuse and concentrated review, there are still differences. In this chapter, the comparative merits and problems of concentrated versus diffuse review are evaluated. In order to compare the types of apex courts, a normative concept of constitutional review is developed. According to this concept, the most important precondition for legitimate and effective constitutional review is the difference between judicial and political decision-making. Judges who are capable of respecting this difference, enhance social integration by establishing a specific mechanism to correct procedural and substantive injustices. When evaluated by this standard, neither supreme nor constitutional courts are superior. Rather, the problem of both practices concerns a gradual process of a judicialization of politics. More and more political questions are decided by apex courts with constitutional review power, thereby reducing political alternatives. In concluding, a division of labor between judges and legislators is suggested that promises legitimate and effective constitutional review enriching democratic governance.
The chapter presents a comparative analysis of the application of proportionality in the six jurisdictions analysed in the book: Germany, Canada, South Africa, Israel, Poland, and India. The analysis focuses on the relationship and division of labour between proportionality's subtests and the function of the multi-stage doctrine as a whole. Examining two central attributes of the proportionality doctrine in the theoretical literature – the sequential structure of the analysis and the conception of a single dominant element – the chapter demonstrates how several of the analysed courts deviate from a strictly sequential model and present a tendency towards an integrated approach to proportionality. Descriptively, some potential causes for the gravitation of courts towards an integrative model of proportionality are offered. Normatively, the argument is made that an integrative use of proportionality analysis is also desirable: recognizing the connections between the stages and allowing feedback between them fully exploits the analytical potential inherent in proportionality analysis. This type of proportionality analysis best reflects the role of the court in ensuring that rights are limited only when justified, and provides the most positive guidance to policy-makers.
Proportionality in Action presents an empirical and comparative exploration of the proportionality doctrine, based on detailed accounts of the application of the framework by apex courts in six jurisdictions: Germany, Canada, South Africa, Israel, Poland and India. The analysis of each country is written and contextualized by a constitutional scholar from the relevant jurisdiction. Each country analysis draws upon a large sample of case law and employs a mixed methodological approach: an expansive coding scheme allows for quantitative analysis providing comparable and quantifiable measurements, which is enriched by qualitative analysis that engages with the substance of the decisions and captures nuance, contextualizing the data and providing it with meaning. The book concludes with a comparative chapter that synthesizes some of the most interesting findings. Focusing on deviations of the practice of proportionality from theory, the authors conclude their argument in support of an integrated approach to the application of proportionality.
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