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This chapter develops an account of intentional action centred on the notion of agential control. The core thesis, Intentionality as Control, proposes that acting intentionally simply is acting with control. Drawing on the account of control defended in the previous chapter, it argues that intentional action requires practical knowledge of what one is doing. The chapter addresses several complications, including the distinction between progressive and perfective aspects of action (what one is doing versus what one has done), with particular attention to ballistic actions where control is temporally limited. One consequence of this account is a version of the controversial thesis that acting intentionally requires knowing what you are doing. This requirement is defended against objections. Finally, the chapter concludes by showing how this control-centric approach can accommodate the insights of more traditional accounts that focus on reasons explanation as the key to the nature of intentional action.
This chapter considers the place of the four books of the Parts of Animals (PA) within Aristotle’s envisaged sequence of biological writings. It argues that PA I belongs integrally with II–IV (rather than being a self-standing theoretical essay) and that the entire project of PA I–IV presupposes key theoretical and factual discoveries made in the Historia Animalium (HA), contra the ‘Balme hypothesis’ according to which HA postdates the explanatory treatises and represents a more advanced stage of inquiry. Finally, it shows that the mantra “being is prior to coming-to-be” (which governs the PA–GA axis) has important implications for our understanding of the explanations in PA II–IV. It concludes with some remarks on the overall structure of Aristotle’s biological corpus.
This chapter removes some obstacles that interfere with the correct understanding of ‘Teleology’ in Hegel’s Logic. According to a common mistake, ‘Teleology’ addresses the external purposiveness of human intentions. This misconstruction emerges from Hegel’s discussion of ‘subjective purposes’ therein and then apparently of the means employed by a person trying to achieve them. Another important misunderstanding affects the kind of reflexive argument that ‘Teleology’ develops. Among those who take it that the chapter addresses the difficulties of realising intentions, some claim that it provides an anti-sceptical transcendental argument to prove the effectiveness of some purposes. I make my case against this kind of interpretation before I present my own alternative account in the following chapter.
This chapter first introduces Aristotle’s doctrine of the four causes: material cause, formal cause, efficient cause and final cause. It is followed by the covering law model with its two versions: the deductive-nomological model, which is deterministic, and the inductive-statistical model, which is probabilistic. There are a number of counterexamples revealing the flaws of the covering law model, and the chapter discusses three: the barometer, the birth-control pill and the flagpole. A key defect of the model is that it does not involve the notion of causal mechanism. In contrast, mechanismic explanation traces the causal chain that produces the effect of interest and avoids the problems represented by the three counterexamples. Intentional explanation attempts to explain human behavior by intentional causation that treats reasons as causes. Although the terms teleological explanation and functional explanation are often used interchangeably, teleological explanation deals with conscious intent to achieve goals and is only applicable to human actions whereas functional explanation is concerned with the contribution of an entity to the future maintenance of a system of which the entity is a part. Historical explanation focuses on explaining the occurrence of some particular event by describing how it came to be. Finally, in contrast to variance theorizing that only examines the covariation among independent and dependent variables, process organization studies take time sequencing and ordering of events to be critical in conjuring up an explanation.
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