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The Western account of political realism stresses that politics is outside ethics, having its own distinctive principles that are internal to it, thus being irreducible to some foundational moral principles and values. This dominant account of political realism, however, is deeply a-cultural, failing to note that politics is always embedded in a specific culture composed of distinctive moral principles and practices. This chapter explores multiple visions of political realism advanced by Korean Neo-Confucians – hence, varieties of “Confucian realism” – when they wrestled with addressing various kinds of contingencies in their own political circumstances through the use of “the expedient” or taking a “Xunzian turn.” This chapter explores the core ideas of each Korean Neo-Confucian thinker discussed in the book, and shows how they could strike the middle ground between Confucian moral economy and the political reality in which they found themselves, thereby generating a sense of reality from within Confucianism.
This chapter draws attention to a Confucian monarch’s struggle to reconceptualize Joseon’s statehood and its Confucian constitutionality in the late Joseon period. It focuses on King Jeongjo 正祖 (r. 1776–1800), who is best known for his reform policies in the areas encompassing politics, military, economy, and culture, which aimed to revitalize the waning Confucian state. Central to this chapter is the claim that Jeongjo attempted to go beyond “institutionalized contingency” through the judicious use of “the expedient,” which reinforced his proclaimed standing as a “teacher-king” while elevating his monarchical power as the authoritative arbiter of contending principles of righteousness. Of special note is that the post-Ming interstate context, in which there existed no legitimate Son of Heaven, allowed Jeongjo to enjoy an extensive scope of political autonomy, presenting himself as a sage-king with the right to educate his ministers rather than taking moral-political guidance from them.
This chapter investigates how the moral framework constructed by Zhu Xi with regard to war affected his Neo-Confucian followers in Joseon during the seventeenth century when they confronted the Jurchens’ invasions of 1627 and 1636. Of special interest is how some of the Joseon scholar-officials, despite their full commitment to Neo-Confucianism, were able to justify making peace with the Jurchens, an option generally regarded as unreasonable and immoral. By examining Choe Myeonggil’s 崔鳴吉 (1586–1647) pro-peace argument, this chapter shows that it was by employing “the expedient” that Choe was able to strike a creative balance between righteousness as a universal moral principle, undergirding the Joseon–Ming relationship, and good political consequences, such as the preservation of the state and protection of the people’s well-being. Special attention is given to Choe’s emphasis on Joseon’s special moral status as a foreign vassal state and the “patriotic sentiments” it generated.
This chapter examines how Byeon Gyeryang 卞季良 (1369–1430) struggled to consolidate a nascent dynasty in the context of ritual hierarchy between Ming and Joseon. After the successful establishment of Joseon, Byeon insisted on continuing a ritual practice from the preceding dynasty that was generally regarded by the majority of the Korean ruling elites as deviating from “the standard” of the ritual that underpinned Sino-Korean relations. In Byeon’s view, the task of consolidating the new dynasty simultaneously required Korean public decision-makers to find a way to balance their Neo-Confucian subscription to the interstate moral hierarchy between Ming and Joseon and the latter’s Heaven-given mandate to protect its land and the people. This chapter investigates how Byeon attempted to achieve this balance through the use of “the expedient,” thereby encouraging the Joseon monarch to be fully responsible for the well-being of his people with a renewed commitment to the Mandate of Heaven.
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