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The Russo-Japanese War features a failure of rational bargaining theory. Indeed, it shows how difficult it is for actors to successfully reach a mutually acceptable bargain, even when many of the conditions are favorable. An obvious quid pro quo existed during the crisis, and at one point the Russian ambassador, Rosen, and the Japanese representative actually agreed to it. Nevertheless, Alekseiev, the viceroy of the Russian Far East province – and later, the tsar himself – overruled Rosen. Although we identify several factors that contributed to this bargaining failure, domestic politics played a major role. Agreement occurred at a low(er) bureaucratic level; hard-liners in Russia, however, occupied the highest decision-making level(s) and overruled the obvious solution, thereby causing an unnecessary war. It is also worth noting that when Japan decided on war, it executed a surprise attack on Port Arthur. Because this attack succeeded, Japanese decision-makers learned it was effective and repeated the strategy in 1941 at Pearl Harbor.
The Crimean War is an “unnecessary” war. The Concert of Europe crafted the Vienna Note. Because it satisfied all the principal concerns and interests of the major states – and all the representatives of the major states accepted and endorsed it – the Vienna Note should have resolved the crisis. Hard-liners in England, however, undercut the Concert’s proposal and undermined Aberdeen, the accommodationist prime minister. The prospect of British and French support, in turn, emboldened the Ottoman Empire, leading it to declare war on a much more powerful Russia. The Crimean War case is the obverse of the Eastern Crisis (1839–1841) case – in that Aberdeen, unlike King Louis-Philippe, failed to rein in his two main domestic hard-liners. This provides further evidence that domestic politics is a more important factor than system structure in the escalation dynamics of interstate crises.
The Franco-Prussian War was both unnecessary and imprudent. France initially received all that it demanded from King William of Prussia. Pressure from the legislature and the people of the boulevard, however, then caused French leaders – including Napoleon III – to expand French demands. This allowed Bismarck, the chancellor of Prussia, to manipulate France into declaring a war that he knew Prussia could win. Two characteristics proved fatal for France. First, the French polity and key French leaders succumbed to war hysteria. This allowed emotions to guide their decision-making, rather than rational calculations. Second, an arrogance among French leaders led to military overconfidence and an element of wishful thinking (e.g., about prospective allies). France was, in other words, less powerful than its leaders thought it would be. Finally, the war was imprudent from the French perspective as well. Within two weeks, as a result of French decisions, Napoleon III went into exile, France lost Alsace-Lorraine, a revolt occurred in Paris, and the German states unified.
Why do some international crises between major states escalate to war while others do not? To shed light on this question, this book reviews fifteen such crises during the period 1815–present, including the Crimean War, The Franco-Prussian War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the 2022 Russia-Ukraine War. Each chapter places the crisis at hand in its historical context, provides a narrative of the case's events that focuses on the decision-makers involved, theoretically analyses the case's outcome in light of current research, and inductively draws some lessons from the case for both scholars and policymakers. The book concludes by exploring common patterns and drawing some broader lessons that apply to the practice of diplomacy and international relations theory. Integrating qualitative information with the rich body of quantitative research on interstate war and peace, this unique volume is a major contribution to crisis diplomacy and war studies.
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