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This chapter examines how individuals working in legitimate illegal markets protect property rights and address uncertainties, focusing on unlicensed street vending in China. Street vending is an essential part of urban economies in developing countries like China, with most street vendors operating outside state regulation. They encounter market-based uncertainties and unpredictable law enforcement. Empirical data collected in two Chinese cities suggest that street vendors form private governance organizations to overcome resource limitations, allocate pitches, and resist government interference. Street vendors who cannot rely on effective private governance organizations may purchase protection from a third party (e.g., agents of the state) to secure informal rights to a particular spot and avoid confiscation of their wares and equipment. This study contributes to the existing literature on extralegal governance institutions in illegal markets that are morally legitimate yet legally unauthorized.
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