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In this chapter I extend the analysis of the previous chapter to defense against innocent threats. Once again, the norm against intending death applies, but the standards for permissible killing as a side effect are stricter than in the case of unjust threats.
This chapter critiques Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous defense of abortion by addressing the question of ownership of the mother’s body. It then addresses the question of "vital conflict" cases: cases of abortion in which the mother’s life is in imminent danger.
Everyone recognizes that it is, in general, wrong to intentionally kill a human being. But are there exceptions to that rule? In Killing and Christian Ethics, Christopher Tollefsen argues that there are no exceptions: the rule is absolute. The absolute view on killing that he defends has important implications for bioethical issues at the beginning and end of life, such as abortion and euthanasia. It has equally important implications for the morality of capital punishment and the morality of killing in war. Tollefsen argues that a lethal act is morally permissible only when it is an unintended side effect of one's action. In this way, some lethal acts of force, such as personal self-defense, or defense of a polity in a defensive war, may be justified -- but only if they involve no intension of causing death. Even God, Tollefsen argues, neither intends death, nor commands the intentional taking of life.
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