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This chapter examines the lead-up to the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq as a prime illustration of two distinct motives for insincere coercion: mobilizing the support of a key ally and making an example of a target. Following the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration shifted from a strategy of containment to one of preventive war and regime change. Although the United States had already formalized a foreign policy objective of regime change in Iraq, President George W. Bush pursued coercive diplomacy through the United Nations to secure Security Council Resolution 1441. The chapter argues that this diplomatic effort was not a genuine attempt to disarm Iraq peacefully but an instrumental maneuver to help British Prime Minister Tony Blair overcome domestic opposition and secure the United Kingdom’s diplomatic and military support. Furthermore, the chapter details how the US administration utilized the destruction of the Iraqi regime to make an example, aiming to deter other rogue nations, including Libya and North Korea, from pursuing weapons of mass destruction. Ultimately, the Iraqi case demonstrates how intentional coercion failure may be used as an instrumental step towards brute force war.
This chapter examines the interwar period between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, focusing specifically on the US containment strategy from 1991 to 1998. Analyzing crises such as the 1994 Kuwaiti Border Crisis, Operation Desert Strike, and Operation Desert Fox, the chapter illustrates how a coercer can use intentional coercion failure to mobilize international support for long-term containment. During this period, the United States demanded that Iraq comply with United Nations weapons inspections. However, the US increasingly preferred that coercion fail; rather than accepting Iraqi concessions that would eventually lead to the lifting of sanctions, American policymakers utilized Iraqi intransigence to justify the continued imposition of severe economic and military costs. This approach was driven by a fundamental lack of assurance – exacerbated by revelations of Iraq’s “cheat and retreat” tactics – that Saddam Hussein would ever genuinely abandon his weapons programs or regional ambitions. Ultimately, this chapter demonstrates that when a coercer does not trust a target to honor agreements, insincere coercion becomes a foreign policy tool to maintain the alliances necessary to keep an adversary perpetually weak.
More than a decade after the Persian Gulf War, the United States went to war against Iraq for the second time. This conflict grew out of fear and distrust of Saddam Hussein’s suspected chemical and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. A highly inaccurate intelligence assessment contributed to the fear of Iraq’s phantom WMD. Except for Britain, the permanent members of the Security Council opposed the war. George W. Bush put together a coalition of the willing to invade Iraq in 2003. The opening, conventional phase of the intervention went well with Baghdad seized in three weeks. But soon the Pentagon faced a raging insurgency in much of the country, which was divided along sectarian lines of the Sunni and Shiite Islamic sects fighting each other while attacking the US and allied forces. The intractable insurgency proved complex and deeply rooted. By 2006, the Pentagon looked as it was headed toward defeat. Three factors contributed to a turnaround in its fortunes. Chief among these was the Awakening movement in which Sunni Arab tribal leaders crossed over to the American side because of their resentment of Salafi-jihadi militants. The Bush White House adopted a finely-tuned counterinsurgency strategy and surged 28,500 more troops into the fray. During the intense fighting, Bush pushed several elections and a constitution to entrench democracy. Gun battles and street bombings greatly subsided by the time Barack Obama withdrew all US combat troops in 2011.
This study intended to create symptom-based triage algorithms for the initial encounter with terror-attack victims. The goals of the triage algorithms include: (1) early recognition; (2) avoiding contamination; (3) early use of antidotes; (4) appropriate handling of unstable, contaminated victims; and (5) provisions of force protection. The algorithms also address industrial accidents and emerging infections, which have similar clinical presentations and risks for contamination as weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Methods:
The algorithms were developed using references from military and civilian sources. They were tested and adjusted using a series of theoretical patients from a CD-ROM chemical, biological, radiological/nuclear, and explosive victim simulator. Then, the algorithms were placed into a card format and sent to experts in relevant fields for academic review.
Results:
Six inter-connected algorithms were created, described, and presented in figure form. The “attack” algorithm, for example, begins by differentiating between overt and covert attack victims (A covert attack is defined by epidemiological criteria adapted from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommendations). The attack algorithm then categorizes patients either as stable or unstable. Unstable patients flow to the “Dirty Resuscitation” algorithm, whereas, stable patients flow to the “Chemical Agent” and “Biological Agent” algorithms. The two remaining algorithms include the “Suicide Bomb/Blast/Explosion” and the “Radiation Dispersal Device” algorithms, which are inter-connected through the overt pathway in the “Attack” algorithm.
Conclusion:
A civilian, symptom-based, algorithmic approach to the initial encounter with victims of terrorist attacks, industrial accidents, or emerging infections was created. Future studies will address the usability of the algorithms with theoretical cases and utility in prospective, announced and unannounced, field drills. Additionally, future studies will assess the effectiveness of teaching modalities used to reinforce the algorithmic approach.