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Chapter 5 examines three cases involving victims of rape: Adama Vandi v. Sierra Leone, Ekundayo Idris v. The Federal Republic of Nigeria, and Satta Lamin Banya v. Republic of Sierra Leone. In two of these judgments, there was a partial award of the applicants’ claims for violations against the defendant states, as well as the remedies sought, while in the third case, all claims were granted. In the cases of Vandi and E.I., the Court declined to declare the respective defendant states liable for GBV as a form of gender-based discrimination, which was the specific relief sought by the applicants. However, it did issue such a declaration in Banya. The Court’s reasoning for this decline echoes its reasoning in Njemanze, discussed in Chapter 2. Nonetheless, the Court’s finding of gender-based discrimination in Banya was not supported by its earlier jurisprudence set out in Njemanze. Essentially, the ECOWAS Court is reluctant to declare a violation of gender-based discrimination by a state on the basis of individual victims unless the violation is demonstrated to be systemic. This chapter explains how this reasoning is rooted in the Court’s first Maputo Protocol decision – Njemanze – which drew on the ideology of the Velasquez case that established the due diligence principle. It argues that a broader and proper application of the due diligence principle could expand the Court’s limited perspective on state responsibility for human rights violations. The discussion contrasts the proposed wider application of the principle with the implications it may have on the Court’s functioning, given its liberal access rules, highlighting the need for a balanced approach.
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