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14 - Kabul, 2021 – The Taliban Overtakes Kabul

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 July 2026

Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning
Affiliation:
Norwegian Intelligence School (NORIS) Norway
Stig Stenslie
Affiliation:
Norwegian Intelligence School (NORIS) Norway
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Summary

The sudden collapse of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in the face of the Taliban advance of July–August 2021 stands as a crucial moment of national embarrassment for the two intervening powers with the greatest exposure there: the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). Despite ample warning from multiple sources that the Taliban was rapidly advancing, and despite large parts of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police (ANP) evaporating before the onslaught, neither the United States nor the United Kingdom made adequate plans to deal with the GIRoA's collapse and its implications for their remaining interests in the country. Strategic intelligence analysis of the situation by US and UK analysts had predicted state collapse but generally on a longer timeline. Tactical warning was also lacking: The situation's rapidity and the two governments’ inability to understand and adapt to the situation led to chaotic evacuations of Afghanistan on terms dictated by the Taliban. This case is one of some accurate strategic warning married to tactical intelligence failure, leading to policy failure and surprise. It is both Type A and Type B failure.

The United Kingdom and the United States present slightly different classes of failure. For the United Kingdom, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office's (FCDO) lack of planning meant that ‘at the strategic and humanitarian level, the evacuation fell disastrously short’. As a parliamentary committee reported, ‘There were systemic failures of intelligence, diplomacy, planning and preparation, which raise questions about [the] machinery of Government, principally the National Security Council.’

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