Introduction

On 9 October 2006, less than a week after the Kim Jong Il regime announced its intention to do so, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. Conducted underground at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, it carried an estimated explosion yield of around one to two kilotons (kt) and some radioactive elements. One week later, the US Director of National Intelligence confirmed the test and its yield. The explosive output of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK; the official name of North Korea) first nuclear test was comparatively smaller than other countries’ first tests – about 10kt to 20kt – eliciting initial scepticism about the nature of the seismic activity detected.

Seventeen years later, the debate over the success or failure of the DPRK's 2006 nuclear test seems largely irrelevant. The world now confronts the third generation of North Korea's leadership under Kim Jong Un, who has proven even more determined and undeterred to expand and sophisticate his country's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program as the means to attaining his longerterm objectives vis-a-vis the United States, South Korea and the international community.

Hindsight being 20/20, it is worth examining the events surrounding the DPRK's 2006 nuclear test ex post facto. We aim to determine what, if any, warnings about North Korea's impending actions the regime issued before the incident or could have been ‘pieced together’ from the DPRK's accumulated behaviour, statements and other indications in the years leading up to the fateful nuclear test.