Introduction

The classical Indian philosophers developed highly articulated theories of the self, often claiming a correct understanding of the nature of the self to be a necessary, or sometimes even a sufficient, condition for liberation. Indian theories of the self traditionally divide into two broad classes: those who explain our diachronic and synchronic identity by reference to an enduring substantial self (ātmavādins) and those who deny the existence of such a self, taking instead a ‘modal’ view of reality (anātmavādins). The orthodox Hindu philosophers and the Jainas all take the former view. Hence, though they disagree on the nature and number of such selves, they are all non-reductionists of some sort about our identity. Most Indian Buddhist philosophers (including the Theravādins, the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrāntikas, the Yogācārins and the Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas) take the latter view and hence are all plausibly classifiable as reductionists about our identity.

This chapter begins by introducing how the problem of the self arises in accounting for the nature and felt unity of our experiences, both at a time and over time. It then goes on to focus in particular on the dualistic theories of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya-Yoga, the non-dualism of Advaita Vedānta, and the Buddhist ‘no-self’ theory. Finally, it addresses the issue of the supposed normative implications of these rival Indian theories of the self.

The problem of the self

The problem of the self arose for the ancient Indian philosophers much as it did for Western philosophers. In both traditions one way into the problem is to take the self (ātman) to be whatever it is that is the referent of the term ‘I’ in sentences like ‘I am now conscious’, ‘I cooked this rice’, ‘I remember attending my daughter's wedding’, and so on. Minimally characterized in this way, the existence of the self seems indubitable. Hence the great Advaitin philosopher Śaṃkara (eighth century) claims that denial of the self is just straightforwardly self-refuting, appealing to a sort of cogito argument: