Introduction

Contrary to much popular Western belief, classical Indian philosophy was not indistinguishable from Indian religion – as even a cursory glance at the earlier chapters of this book will demonstrate. But religious concerns did motivate the work of many Indian philosophers (as they did too the work of many of the great Western philosophers), and there surely is something that can be described as ‘Indian philosophy of religion’, that is, ‘philosophy of Indian religions’ (Matilal 1982, Perrett 1989, 2001 (vol. iv)). However, important differences between the major Indian religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism) mean that the shape of Indian philosophy of religion is often significantly different from that of Western philosophy of religion.

One fundamental difference is that theism is not central to all the Indian religions in the way that it is to the major Western religions. While there certainly were classical Indian philosophers who were staunch monotheists (e.g., the Viśiṣṭādvaitins, the Dvaitins, the Śaiva Siddhāntins), overall this was not the dominant trend. In the first place, Buddhism and Jainism are both non-theistic religions. Then, within Hinduism, orthodoxy is determined by an acknowledgement of the authority of the Vedas, not a belief in God. Hence among the orthodox Hindu schools, Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā are both atheistic, Advaita Vedānta is ultimately non-theistic, and Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are minimally theistic in the sense that they allow only significantly attenuated powers to God. Two implications of this for Indian philosophy of religion are evident. First, Indian philosophy of religion is much less centred on philosophical theology than is Western philosophy of religion. Second, even when the Indians engage in philosophical theology, it often has a rather different flavour (see Pereira 1976, Clooney 1993, 1996).

Consider, for instance, Indian discussions of the problem of evil (Herman 1976, Matilal 1982). The theistic problem of evil is how to reconcile the existence of evil with the existence of an omnipotent and benevolent God. Jaina and Buddhist atheists appealed to the existence of evil as an atheological argument, but Indian theists responded by limiting God's powers, holding that even God is constrained by individuals’ karma. Nor did they accept that the existence of evil in the world showed that the world is not God's creation. The world is God's līlā or divine play, a creation with no purpose, and hence something for which God bears no moral responsibility.