Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 August 2026
This chapter overturns the longstanding consensus that Aquinas identified the transcendentals of De veritate q. 1, art. 1 – that is, thing, one, something, true, and good – as the properties of being. Instead, they should be identified with disjunctive pairs like necessary or contingent, universal or particular, prior or posterior, one or many, and actual or potential. This radical revision in how we think of Aquinas’s account of the properties of being brings with it a corresponding reorientation of Thomistic metaphysics – for if what is primarily “at issue” in Aquinas’s metaphysics is the demonstrability of these disjunctive properties, then Thomistic metaphysics will place a far higher premium on themes like the diversity of being and ontological degree than is typically presented.
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.