Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 January 2026
In Petronius's Satyrica, Eumolpus tells Encolpius the story of the Pergamene Boy, which recounts his former sexual relationship with a pupil. This chapter argues that the narrator Eumolpus trivialises and suppresses his victimisation of the boy by strategically ignoring Roman legal and social custom when presenting this sexual relationship through the literary and cultural lens of Athenian pederasty, specifically by parodying Plato's Symposium. The framing of the tale through the lens of Athenian rather than Roman social customs is so successful, in fact, that scholarly assessments largely fail to acknowledge that Eumolpus's actions amount to stuprum, a legal charge governing unsanctioned sexual relations with Roman boys, women, widows and girls. I argue that Eumolpus commits a type of epistemic injustice – contributory injustice – by utilising prejudiced hermeneutical resources that harm the epistemic agency of the boy and his parents. By applying the concept of contributory injustice to a literary narrative from ancient Rome, my aim is to show how narration raises epistemological issues related to authority, reliability and privilege that are particularly relevant for the legal and cultural recognition of sexual violence. After identifying the contributory injustice done to the family, I apply the modern concept of child grooming to the story to improve our understanding of the victims’ experience that is largely silenced in the abuser's narrative.
In arguing that Eumolpus as interpreter and narrator does epistemic harm to the Pergamene boy and his parents, this chapter builds on Fricker's foundational work on epistemic injustice, which she further breaks into testimonial and hermeneutical categories. Subsequent theorists object to Fricker's notion that hermeneutical injustice is structural and nonagential, and Pohlhaus Jr proposes that hermeneutical injustice also exists in the distinct form of wilful hermeneutical ignorance, ‘when dominantly situated knowers refuse to acknowledge epistemic tools developed from the experienced world of those situated marginally’.
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