Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- General Introduction
- Part IHistorical Antecedents and Philosophical Debates
- Introduction to Part I
- 1The Capabilities Approach and the History of Philosophy
- 2Karl Marx and the Capabilities Approach
- 3Utility and Capability
- 4Intellectual History and Defending the Capabilities Approach
- 5Sen, Smith and the Cambridge Tradition
- 6The Capability Approach to Well-Being and Freedom from the Viewpoint of Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory
- 7Resources or Capabilities?
- 8Taking Multidimensionality Seriously
- 9The Capabilities Approach and Political Liberalism
- 10Selecting a List
- 11Individualism and the Capability Approach
- 12The Politics of Wonder
- Part IIMethods, Measurement and Empirical Evidence
- Part IIIIssues in Public Policy
- Index
- References
7 - Resources or Capabilities?
An Introduction to the Debate
from Part I - Historical Antecedents and Philosophical Debates
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2020
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- General Introduction
- Part IHistorical Antecedents and Philosophical Debates
- Introduction to Part I
- 1The Capabilities Approach and the History of Philosophy
- 2Karl Marx and the Capabilities Approach
- 3Utility and Capability
- 4Intellectual History and Defending the Capabilities Approach
- 5Sen, Smith and the Cambridge Tradition
- 6The Capability Approach to Well-Being and Freedom from the Viewpoint of Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory
- 7Resources or Capabilities?
- 8Taking Multidimensionality Seriously
- 9The Capabilities Approach and Political Liberalism
- 10Selecting a List
- 11Individualism and the Capability Approach
- 12The Politics of Wonder
- Part IIMethods, Measurement and Empirical Evidence
- Part IIIIssues in Public Policy
- Index
- References
Summary
This chapter gives an introduction to the debate between resourcists and capabilitarians on the best metric for interpersonal comparisons of ‘advantage’. It starts by identifying a number of factors that complicate the debate and should be kept in mind while reading this body of literature. The remainder of the chapter zooms in on the philosophical literature about justice, addressing two main topics. The first is the existence of immense human diversity, which resourcists like Rawls and Pogge insufficiently acknowledge and address according to capabilitarians. The second topic is neutrality towards the good life, a value which capabilitarians like Nussbaum fail to respect according to resourcists. In the course of the chapter, several theoretical distinctions are identified that underlie the debate: chance versus choice, natural versus social causes, ideal versus non-ideal theories of justice and distributive justice versus justice as recognition. The difference between resourcists and capabilitarians, so it is concluded, is as much a difference in how they frame the debate about justice as a difference in the evaluative space that they defend.
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- The Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach , pp. 126 - 145Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
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