This chapter explores the enumeration of national legislative powers as a cornerstone of the U.S. Constitution’s compound republic, arguing that it both empowers and limits Congress to specific domains while also curbing executive authority. Despite the Constitutional Convention’s initial rejection of enumerated powers in favor of broad legislative authority over matters where states were incompetent, the Committee of Detail enumerated powers so that it could assign historically royal prerogatives, like war and commerce, to the legislature. The chapter highlights Federalist assertions, from Madison to Wilson, that Congress is confined to these enumerated powers, reinforced by the Tenth Amendment and debates over a bill of rights, which Federalists deemed unnecessary due to limited national authority. It critiques revisionist claims that Congress was not strictly bound by enumeration, finding them unpersuasive. The enumeration, the chapter concludes, ensures a balanced federal system, aligning with the Framers’ intent to create a government competent for national purposes while preserving state sovereignty and minimizing the risk of executive tyranny.