Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-tnkh4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T23:07:26.398Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - Creeping Reform

Reconfiguring the Political Infrastructure

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2013

Donald L. Horowitz
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
Get access

Summary

The Indonesian achievement is all the more noteworthy considering the preexisting constitution, with its murky relations between the MPR and the president, its unique legislature and supralegislature, the latter with unelected military, regional, and functional-group members, its hypercentralization, and its absence of legal controls. That a gradual reform reduced these anomalies progressively until they disappeared, and ultimately produced a defensible set of institutions, was in itself remarkable.

It was clear from the beginning that the 1945 constitution, sacred to some, deeply flawed to others, was, for the moment, untouchable if the process were to get off to a smooth start. For that reason, Habibie’s policy of elections before amendment was uncontested. Apart from that, nothing about possible new institutions was clear, and just about everything was in flux.

Much changed along the way. At the outset and even much later, there was considerable support for single-member, constituency-based elections, so as to kill central party dictatorship and hold representatives accountable to the voters. Yet such an electoral law was never enacted. There was, likewise, great doubt about whether there would or could be a directly elected president. Many wanted presidential accountability to the electorate, but powerful forces opposed it, and some feared a strong presidency would revive authoritarianism. In 1998, there was much sentiment in favor of – in the most popular phrase of the period – checks and balances, indeed so many of them that there might be a proliferation of veto centers: a president and vice president from different parties (possibly elected indirectly), a multiparty cabinet, two or even three houses of the legislature (the DPR, MPR, and a new regional house), staggered terms, strong judicial review, regional devolution, and a broad, sword-of-Damocles impeachment power. With a parliament divided among four or five main parties, these institutions might well produce weak government with a high degree of internal conflict and immobilism.

Information

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Book purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Creeping Reform
  • Donald L. Horowitz, Duke University, North Carolina
  • Book: Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139225724.005
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Creeping Reform
  • Donald L. Horowitz, Duke University, North Carolina
  • Book: Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139225724.005
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Creeping Reform
  • Donald L. Horowitz, Duke University, North Carolina
  • Book: Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139225724.005
Available formats
×