Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Controlling Governments
- Introduction
- 1 Explaining the Electoral Performance of Incumbents in Democracies
- 2 How Can Governments Be Accountable If Voters Vote Ideologically?
- 3 Enduring Ethnicity: The Political Survival of Incumbent Ethnic Parties in Western Democracies
- 4 Performance or Representation? The Determinants of Voting in Complex Political Contexts
- 5 Political Knowledge and the Logic of Voting: A Comparative Study
- 6 The Political Consequences of Internal Party Democracy
- 7 Choosing Rules for Government: The Institutional Preferences of Early Socialist Parties
- 8 Constitutions and Democratic Breakdowns
- Author Index
- Subject Index
- References
Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 October 2009
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Controlling Governments
- Introduction
- 1 Explaining the Electoral Performance of Incumbents in Democracies
- 2 How Can Governments Be Accountable If Voters Vote Ideologically?
- 3 Enduring Ethnicity: The Political Survival of Incumbent Ethnic Parties in Western Democracies
- 4 Performance or Representation? The Determinants of Voting in Complex Political Contexts
- 5 Political Knowledge and the Logic of Voting: A Comparative Study
- 6 The Political Consequences of Internal Party Democracy
- 7 Choosing Rules for Government: The Institutional Preferences of Early Socialist Parties
- 8 Constitutions and Democratic Breakdowns
- Author Index
- Subject Index
- References
Summary
We discuss in this book some core topics in the positive theory of democracy. We try to understand the relationship between citizens and politicians: what guides voters at election time, why governments survive and fall, and how institutions modify the power of the people over politicians. These are all relevant questions to determine the role of elections in democracy. Note, however, that elections can be analyzed from many other perspectives different from the representative dimension of democracy. Thus, elections can be also interpreted as an epistemic device to reach the right decision (Coleman 1989); as an exercise of self-government (Przeworski 2005); or as an opportunity for participation and deliberation (Elster 1998).
This book focuses on the representative side of democracy – how rule for the people and rule by the people are connected. Do elections (rule by the people) induce politicians to act in a representative way (rule for the people)? A common theme in all the contributions here included may sound commonsensical or even trivial: we need to combine some analytical rigor with empirical analysis. If we dare to say something so obvious, it is because the field is badly divided into formal analysis and empirical studies. We take seriously what we have learned from economic models of democracy, but we use these conclusions to organize the empirical research of cases that are far removed from the assumptions made in the formal literature.
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- Controlling GovernmentsVoters, Institutions, and Accountability, pp. 1 - 16Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007
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