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5 - Performance Legitimacy

Absolute Liabilities, Heavy Punishments, and Collective Lies

from Part I - Criminalizing the Empire

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2026

Liang Cai
Affiliation:
University of Notre Dame, Indiana
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Summary

Early imperial officials, while enforcing the law, were paradoxically its victims too. They were keenly aware of the stark and ironic contrast between the theoretical design of the legal system and its practical enactment. The law’s meticulous statutes were designed to guide people on what to avoid, yet this led to an over-complication of the law such that commoners did not know what to avoid. The high performance mandated by the law to prevent negligence and laxity ironically ended up punishing those who were earnestly committed to their duties. The principle of assessing results according to predefined objectives was meant to hold officials accountable, but it ultimately stripped them of discretionary power and overlooked their intentions and efforts. Fearing the repercussions of absolute liability, officials might collectively resort to deceit. Furthermore, while severe punishments were intended to eliminate the need for future punishment and establish a crime-free utopia, they criminalized a vast swath of officials and commoners alike. Reforms aimed at simplifying the law were initiated by two different emperors, yet both seem to have failed.

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  • Performance Legitimacy
  • Liang Cai, University of Notre Dame, Indiana
  • Book: Convict Politics
  • Online publication: 09 January 2026
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009019866.006
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  • Performance Legitimacy
  • Liang Cai, University of Notre Dame, Indiana
  • Book: Convict Politics
  • Online publication: 09 January 2026
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009019866.006
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Performance Legitimacy
  • Liang Cai, University of Notre Dame, Indiana
  • Book: Convict Politics
  • Online publication: 09 January 2026
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009019866.006
Available formats
×