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9 - July 1914

from Part III - The Twentieth Century through World War II

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 November 2025

John A. Vasquez
Affiliation:
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Andrew P. Owsiak
Affiliation:
University of Georgia
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Summary

July 1914 escalates because of a deterrence failure. Germany and Russia were playing a game of chicken. The kaiser stood firm; he believed that Russia was not prepared for war and would therefore back down. The tsar likewise stood firm; he vowed not to back down again after the Bosnian Crisis – and he thought that Germany would ultimately back down because it would not want to fight the combined power of Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. With neither side yielding, the crisis continued to escalate. A second dynamic contributed to escalation as well. At some point – probably on July 30 – the actors changed strategy. Instead of using coercion to deter their opponent, they started taking coercive measures to increase the likelihood that they would win a war, if one began. Each side mobilized, and mobilization led to war. Beneath all this lay rivalry and the repetition of crises between the major states. Finally, once war broke out between Germany and Russia, the alliance structure caused the war to spread rapidly. From this crisis, we learn many lessons, including that a balance of power and relatively equal military capabilities are associated with war onset; they do not prevent war.

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  • July 1914
  • John A. Vasquez, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Andrew P. Owsiak, University of Georgia
  • Book: Crises, War, and Diplomacy
  • Online publication: 07 November 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009652063.014
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  • July 1914
  • John A. Vasquez, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Andrew P. Owsiak, University of Georgia
  • Book: Crises, War, and Diplomacy
  • Online publication: 07 November 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009652063.014
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • July 1914
  • John A. Vasquez, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Andrew P. Owsiak, University of Georgia
  • Book: Crises, War, and Diplomacy
  • Online publication: 07 November 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009652063.014
Available formats
×