Part II hinges upon what Deleuze calls ‘the paradox of Spinoza’ (P 225|165). The most philosophical philosopher – Spinoza – is also the least. While the paradox bears upon Spinoza, it is unintelligible as a paradox without Deleuze because Deleuze himself determines the senses of ‘philosophy’ and ‘non-philosophy’ that describe Spinoza superlatively and simultaneously. In the last chapter, I approached the first leg of the paradox, arguing that Deleuze invents Spinoza as a conceptual character to operate the immanence with which he defines philosophy. Here, in Chapter 5, I turn to the second leg. Not only the most, Spinoza is also the least philosophical philosopher because his work isn't limited to conceptual understanding. It also solicits, Deleuze says, an affective understanding that appeals to non-philosophers in general and to artists in particular. If the same could be said of every philosopher, if all philosophy incidentally but inevitably has affective effects, all philosophers are not equally paradoxical. Spinoza is the most paradoxical because, beyond this or that and even the most intense individual affect, Deleuze draws the very notion of affect from Spinoza. To clarify and to sharpen the paradox in what follows, accordingly, I first approach the body according to Spinoza in order, in turn, to specify what Deleuze omits and emphasises in Spinoza for his own theory of affect and how, finally, this active inheritance intensifies the ascetic tradition in more than one sense.