Although in What Is Philosophy? Deleuze sets out to clarify why, for him, Spinoza is the prince of philosophers, What Is Philosophy? isn't his final word on Spinoza. Here in Chapter 6, however, I conclude with ‘Spinoza and the Three “Ethics”’, the last text of his last book, not simply for the sake of exhaustion, a principle to which I neither have claimed nor could. The culminating text is indispensable here, rather, because it hardens the paradox structuring the latter part of this book: the most philosophical philosopher, Spinoza, is also the least and even not philosophical at all. Ostensibly, in Deleuze's earlier accounts, nothing in principle prevents Spinoza from holding both titles. On the contrary, the disciplinary difference between the philosophical ‘concept’ and the non-philosophical ‘affect’ would seem to displace any conflict before it could arise. Both, moreover, presuppose the immanence that, for Deleuze and Guattari, Spinoza alone achieves. In ‘Spinoza and the Three “Ethics”’, however, affect and concept do indeed conflict, although ‘conflict’ is only part of the story. As the first ‘Ethics’, affect both grounds and hobbles the progress of Spinoza's system toward its philosophical achievement in the third. Which isn't to say Deleuze is wrong. On the contrary, one could perhaps say of Deleuze with respect to the paradox of Spinoza what Bataille says of Hegel with respect to sacrifice: he didn't know how right he was (Bataille, OEuvres XII:32).