In Chapter 1, I focused upon sensibility in the doctrine of faculties in the third chapter of Difference and Repetition. As the first work in which Deleuze ‘does’ philosophy, it constitutes Deleuze's first theory of affect. Deleuze speaks of ‘sensibility’ rather than ‘affect’, to be sure, but he establishes fundamental features that go unaltered in his later work where the term ‘affect’ prevails. The facultative doctrine, however, isn't the only moment in Difference and Repetition in which sensibility plays a fundamental role. Sensibility also operates the first of the three syntheses of time in the second chapter. I’ll eventually pinpoint coordinates to suggest that sensibility in the doctrine of faculties is sensibility in the first synthesis of time since, not without reason, there has been confusion on this issue, but the systematic solidarity between the syntheses of time and the doctrine of faculties doesn't prevent Deleuze from drawing upon other sources to elaborate sensibility in terms of time. He draws the concept of contemplation, namely, from David Hume.

The paleonym might mislead. This ‘contemplation’ isn't the ‘contemplation’ most readily recognised in or, indeed, inaugural of the philosophical tradition. It isn't Plato's contemplation of Ideas.