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1 - A Case of Thought

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 July 2026

Aidan Tynan
Affiliation:
Cardiff University
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Summary

For Deleuze, all thinking begins in a kind of pathos. This is because thinking must be distinguished from knowledge or mental activity in general: remembering, sensing, imagining and so on. These modes of cognition remain at the purely empirical level of recognisable objects. Thought, however, goes beyond the limits of the recognisable and thus needs to be grasped in a way which distinguishes it from our day-to-day cognition of the world. In other words, thought goes beyond the given differences which allow us to recognise the objects of our experience, and in turn leads towards a realm in which differences are not yet distributed in objects. Thought emerges only through this attempt to think the indifferent. As Deleuze writes, ‘difference is the true logos … indifference is its pathos’ (DI 159). This is why Deleuze and Guattari, in defi ning the practice of philosophy as the creation of concepts, write that philosophy demands a ‘nonphilosophical’ or ‘prephilosophical’ plane, a ‘moving desert that concepts come to populate’. Thought does not begin with the creation of concepts, as this is only made possible by a series of measures that ‘institutes’ or ‘lays out’ the plane: ‘these measures belong to the order of dreams, of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness, and excess’ (WP 40–1). It is only through such a pathos that thinking can properly be called creative, otherwise it would be indistinguishable from mental activity in general.

Thought does not begin by recognising itself in the objects given to consciousness, but by encountering something unrecognisable which presents itself as an impassable obstacle. This is why we must reject the Platonic-Aristotelian notion of a ‘propitious moment’ locating thought in an accord with those objects falling between the categories of the ‘too large’ and the ‘too small’ (DR 29).

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